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Metropolitan Governance: Governing in a City of Cities



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Around the world, urban populations are spreading out beyond their old city limits, rendering traditional municipal boundaries, and, by extension, traditional governing structures and institutions, outdated. This global urbanization trend has led to expansion not just in terms of population settlement and spatial sprawl, but also, and perhaps more importantly, in terms of urban residents' social and economic spheres of influence. As the distinguished urban planner John Friedmann has noted, "we can no longer treat cities apart from the regions surrounding them".¹

The functional areas of cities transcend their physical boundaries. Cities have extensive labour markets, real estate markets, service markets, and financial and business markets that spread over the jurisdictional territories of several municipalities and, in some cases, over more than one state or provincial boundary, or even across international borders.

Increasingly, the practical and economic reach of cities and the growth of city-regions demands more integrated planning, service delivery and policy decisions than multiple but individually bounded cities can provide. Governing in a "city of cities" has therefore become much more complex than governing in a lone municipality, since a decision taken in one city affects the whole region in which the city is located. The development of complex inter-connected urban areas introduces new challenges of governance, particularly metropolitan governance.

Metropolitan governance arrangements affect the levels of harmony and disharmony in cities. Spatial, economic, social, and environmental harmony all depend on effective metropolitan governance, in which city leaders cooperate rather than compete to manage crime, poverty, social inequalities, transport system delivery, infrastructure development, and other issues. Concerns related to increasingly divided

urban societies, together with inequalities and poverty that stretch across large metropolitan areas, point to the need for balanced urban development policies embedded in metropolitan planning and governance frameworks. Cities of different sizes often struggle with issues of metropolitan governance and inter-city harmony, with some experiencing demographic or economic decline and others facing rapid growth and development. Effective metropolitan governance offers potential for urban development that manages such inequalities and creates harmonious regions.

The challenges associated with building effective metropolitan governance arrangements are increasingly complex and integrated. They include:

- the absence of institutional consensus about the delimitations of a unique territory, making the possibility of joint action and convergence on interventions difficult;
- different visions and technical and political positions of authorities in the metropolitan area, with each city authority needing to respond to the requirements of the part of the city it governs²;
- legal restrictions of municipalities on the formulation and implementation of plans and programmes beyond their politico-administrative jurisdictions;
- specialized functions of different municipalities with asymmetrical fiscal systems and notable differences between rich and poor municipalities;
- the existence of politically fragmented institutions for governing metropolitan areas, in the context of important challenges regarding uneven decentralization processes, heightened challenges of metropolitan transportation, deficiencies in critical infrastructure, and the growing need to expand the coverage of social services, address environmental problems, and compete with other cities at a national, continental, and often, a global scale.

The challenges of equitable development among different groups in metropolitan areas also point to the need for major improvements in the provision of public services such as health, decent shelter, education, water and sanitation. Urban poverty has been increasing, and in many cities, spreading outwards, making the peripheries of some metropolitan areas the poorest and most heavily under-served settlements.

These complex issues are highly integrated; their resolution is dependent upon the capacity of area-wide governing institutions to work together in systems relevant to each specific place. Deficient intergovernmental relations, inadequate popular local representation processes, weak sub-national institutions and poor financing mechanisms to support sub-national government systems pose critical questions for policymakers and leaders in all levels of government, as well as for researchers, planners and international agencies.

Empirical evidence shows³ that urban areas around the world continue to relentlessly expand both in terms of density and horizontal space,⁴ many growing and spreading over different administrative boundaries. There is a need to govern these large areas in a coherent

fashion. The importance of recognizing the challenges of metropolitan governance stems from the fact that the world's cities are critical sites for economic production, agglomeration and proximity; for social and cultural development and interaction; for innovation and creativity; and are an essential staging ground for connecting local societies and economies to external networks and the global economy.⁵

From clearly delineated areas to inter-municipal territories

Traditional urban land market theory characterizes cities as having one city centre or central business district, well-defined limits of residential and industrial growth, and a clearly delineated area of commercial influence in a defined larger region, often the surrounding rural hinterland. The reality of cities today, however, is much more complex. Around the world, many once-independent cities have grown into vast metropolitan areas with more than one business centre, diffuse boundaries often defined not so much by local geography as by global reach, extended commercial areas of influence, and highly diversified economies.

For example, the metropolitan area of Mexico City, home to more than 19 million people, extends over the territories of two states and the Federal District, and includes as many as 58 municipalities. The economy of Buenos Aires covers the territories of the city of Buenos Aires, with 3 million people, and the 32 municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires, home to 9 million people. Similarly, in Africa, Metropolitan Johannesburg, with a population of 7.2 million people, encompasses Ekurhuleni (made up of the East Rand), the West Rand District Municipality and the City of Johannesburg, which hosts 3.4 million people.⁶ Abidjan, with a population of 3.8 million, has expanded to encompass 196 local government units that include municipalities and surrounding rural areas.⁷ In Asia, the Metropolitan Manila Area in the Philippines is composed of 10 cities and seven municipalities, with a total population of approximately 11 million, while Cebu City comprises seven cities and six municipalities, with a total population of nearly 2 million people. The Tokyo metropolitan region, with a population of 35 million, contains 365 municipal areas.⁸ In North America, Metropolitan Minneapolis-Saint Paul, with a population of some 3 million people, includes 188 cities and townships.⁹ Portland, Oregon, with approximately 1.8 million inhabitants, covers three counties and 24 local governments.¹⁰

Conceptualizing these vast, and often diffuse, urban territories and their spread across existing municipal boundaries and broader jurisdictions is a difficult task. This conceptual challenge reflects a movement in local governance reform that is in a continuous state of flux, experiment and reformulation. The fact that no internationally agreed-upon definition of a metropolitan area exists adds to the complicated task of understanding how these “cities of cities” function around the world. Most comparative statistics on cities and metropolitan areas are based on data with some limitations

in terms of reliability and comparability, owing to varying definitions of what comprises an urban or metropolitan area in different countries. And because metropolitan areas are rarely legally defined entities, there may be a number of different possible boundaries for a commonly understood extended urban area, such as, for example, New York City and the New York Metropolitan Area, or the City of Toronto and the Greater Toronto Area. Different designations result in different population and sizes estimates.

Modes of metropolitan governance

Despite the fact that metropolitan areas appear in almost all regions of the world, their governance systems differ dramatically, varying on two major criteria: the *degree and level of centralization or control over urban functions* in the metropolitan area or region; and *the degree of formality* in the relationships among the various units in the metropolitan area.

Level and degree of centralization and control

According to a comprehensive study by the National Research Council of the United States in 2003, which examined the metropolitan issue for developing countries, there are four major categories, or models, of metropolitan governance systems. The first, and least structured, is the **fragmented** model. This model is characterized by a number of autonomous or semi-autonomous local government units, each with jurisdiction over particular functions or a specific local territory. Coordination among the individual municipalities or agencies within this structure is usually voluntary and is often sporadic. The most prominent examples of this model, for both larger and smaller metropolitan areas, come from the United States.

A second, related approach is the **mixed** model. In this model, many semi-autonomous local municipalities and governmental organizations work together as a metropolitan area, with some functions falling under the aegis of regional, provincial or national government agencies, while other functions remain the responsibility of local governments. The mixed model presumes a certain level of regionalization of the metropolitan structure, with municipalities and other authorities taking on different levels of regional governance according to the administrative structure of the state.¹¹ The participation of municipalities depends quite often on the willingness of higher levels of government to build consensus among them; it also depends upon their relative weight in terms of demographic, economic and political power. In this model, what is known as the “principle of mutual consideration” integrates the interests of different localities as part of the general metropolitan vision and, simultaneously, the metropolitan vision integrates each municipality into the city. Examples of mixed models are the Moroccan cities of Casablanca and Rabat, the North American cities of Los Angeles and Miami, the county of Stockholm and the province of Milan.

In the mixed model, governments often coordinate spatial and functional operations by establishing specific mechanisms or institutions throughout the metropolitan area for the delivery of services and *ad hoc* functions.¹² In Bangkok, for example, one can describe three “rings” of metropolitan governance. In the first ring, the core city of Bangkok with an estimated population of 5.7 million, there is a Bangkok Metropolitan Administration; in the second ring is the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), which had a total population of 11.5 million people in 2000. Outside the BMR is an expanding third ring, the Extended Bangkok Region, with an approximate population of 17.5 million. The two outer rings are made up of a number of provinces and hundreds of local governments. Many of the most important individual functions, in all three rings, are carried out by state enterprises, national governments, and local authorities. Alternatively, many functions in the fields of health, education, and infrastructure provision are carried out under contract by private service agencies.¹³

In China, the central government guides overall urban development, but metropolitan governance and management take on different operational forms in different cities, with variations in the levels of involvement and cooperation between the central, provincial and municipal governments. Intergovernmental relations vary across cities. Beijing, for example, is directly under the leadership of the Chinese central government, whereas Guangzhou and Harbin are under the leadership of Guangdong and Heilongjiang provinces, respectively. Decision-making powers regarding transport infrastructure construction in all three cities rest with the municipality in cooperation with higher-level government departments of transport, and private construction companies – enterprises appointed by the municipalities – implement the projects. Many cities operate as fairly autonomous municipalities as a result of a shift in governance structures in the recent years, which have evolved from highly centralized systems to decentralized ones.¹⁴

In some cases, mixed models involve international trans-boundary cooperation systems such as the Oresund Committee, which coordinates strategic projects between the metropolitan area of Copenhagen in Denmark and the urban area of Malmo in Sweden; or the Trans-Boundary Permanent Inter-Municipal Conference in the Lille Agglomeration, involving both France and Belgium.

A third logical form of metropolitan governance is the **centralized** model. In this model, the functions and governance of a large metropolitan area are under the control of the central government and its specialized state agencies. Examples of this model are Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam, and Havana, Cuba. Ho Chi Minh City, which had a population of just over 5 million in 2005,¹⁵ is divided into 22 inner and outer districts, each of which has its own People’s Committee and Planning Development Sub-Committee. Members of these committees are normally members of the Viet Nam Communist Party. Most major functions (including urban planning) are under the control of the national government.¹⁶ Havana is another example. Since 1975, Greater Havana



▲ Residential and commercial buildings in Singapore
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has been governed as a city province with 15 municipalities, including such centres as Old Havana, Central Havana, and the Plaza de la Revolución. In 2005, the Greater Havana region had an estimated population of 2.1 million.¹⁷ While a recent account of Havana's governance stresses that locally elected municipal delegates have some formal deliberative powers, most important and contentious issues are referred to higher levels of government for decision.¹⁸ Hong Kong and the city-state of Singapore also operate with centralized models. Until recently, urban problems in Greater Santiago, Chile, were solved by sectoral policies implemented by the different ministries of the central government with a rather limited participation of the local communities.

The fourth type of metropolitan governance is known as the **comprehensive** model. In this model, local authorities have considerable functional power and autonomy over aspects of the whole metropolitan area. Versions of this model are the Metro Area of Helsinki, governed by a Metropolitan Council composed of five municipalities; the Metro Region of Copenhagen; and the Metropolitan District of Quito. In Helsinki, the Metropolitan Council has extensive jurisdiction over various sectors such as transport, land use, environment

and economic development, funded by the state through its Sectoral Development Fund and fiscal revenues obtained at the metropolitan level.

Similar versions of the comprehensive model have operated in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, since 1980, and since November 2000, five major South African cities have seen the municipalities in their metropolitan areas amalgamated into what are locally called "unicities".¹⁹ In the case of Cape Town, for example, the Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality has gained unique powers over a wide range of services, such as land-use management, water and waste water, electricity and gas reticulation, transport, policing, and environmental health. With a staff of 21,297 and a budget (including both recurrent and capital elements) of approximately US\$2.21 billion, it is one of the most sophisticated municipal governments in Africa.²⁰

In terms of historical development, however, Abidjan is in many ways the leader in African metropolitan governance. In 1980, the government of Côte d'Ivoire created a two-tier political and administrative structure for the metropolitan area of Abidjan. At the lowest level were ten communes, with elected mayors and councils who had responsibility for such

local functions as the administration of markets, allocation of plots for public purposes, maintenance of clinics and primary schools, and the operation of social centres. The major functions of the upper-tier government were waste disposal and management; sanitation, traffic regulation, road and park maintenance; and town planning. The mayor of the upper-tier metropolitan council was chosen by his communal colleagues. Major utilities such as water and electricity were managed by private, licensed companies. While this system worked reasonably well for more than 20 years, it was replaced in 2001 by the “District of Abidjan”, consisting of the original ten communes (with their own governance systems) supplemented by three large sub-prefectures on the outskirts of the city. Beginning in 2002, the new District of Abidjan was reconfigured administratively under a governor, who, in turn, is appointed to a five-year term by the president of the republic. The governor represents the winning party in the communal elections and is assisted by a district council of 51, whose members are two-thirds elected at large and one-third selected by the communes. The same distribution of functions between the district and the communes is the same as it was between the old “City of Abidjan” and the communes before 2001.²¹

Degree of formality in governance structure and processes

A second, and arguably more common, way of characterizing metropolitan functions is by their degree of formality. In principle, there are two possibilities: either **formal structures** of metropolitan governance (which can be one- or two-tiered, and can be based on formal cooperative structures that bring together many municipalities and agencies); or **informal structures** of cooperation among agencies and municipalities. Various scholars have argued that some formal structure of metropolitan governance needs to be drawn up both to rationalize provision of public services (such as transport, policing, and waste disposal) over large areas, and to prevent inequities of resource distribution among different contiguous areas.²² In large cities with extensive impoverished neighbourhoods, whether contiguous or scattered, the poor may find better collective representation in a formal, metropolitan-level structure than in isolated local government units. Depending on how representation and governance are structured, there should, in principle, be little difference as to whether metropolitan governance is more or less successful in small or large cities. Ultimately, as cities grow, they must respond to the functional challenges of adequate financial



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Trafalgar Square, London
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empowerment, a broad operational mandate across sectors, the necessity to achieve a degree of civic engagement for the whole city, and the need to incorporate built-in systems of monitoring and feedback. To the extent they meet these challenges, distributional inequities can be mitigated, even as development takes place.

There are both “strong” and “weak” examples of the formal model. In strong versions of the model, central authorities have strong leadership and clear lines of authority; in weak versions, central authority is limited and there are often unclear lines of authority connecting the participating councils or local government units. “Strong” examples are the former Greater London Council, abolished in 1986; the present Comunidad Autonomy de Madrid; and the Metropolitan District of Quito. Other examples are the French Urban Communes of Lille, Bordeaux and Strasbourg; the Glasgow Clyde Valley Joint Committee; and the Stadsregio of Rotterdam, a public entity of voluntary status that is composed of 40 members elected by each municipality and the Regional Council and chaired by the mayor of Rotterdam.²³ “Weak” examples are the Verband Regio Stuttgart, the present Greater London Authority, the Metropolitan District of Portland,²⁴ and the Regional Authority of Bologna. In the developing world, the formal models of the five South African unities comprise “strong” examples, as does the new District of Abidjan. Other strong formal metropolitan governance structures in the developing world are operating in the major Chinese cities of Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Chongqing, which have been designated as provinces by the central government. More “weak” examples of formal structures include the metropolitan governments of Bangkok, Manila and Munich.

Some formal structures are represented by specific associations created for planning and urban management purposes at the metropolitan level. These associations are specialized bodies with consultative powers, such as the *Agence d'Urbanisme* in France, the Planning Association of German Cities, the Metropolitan Junta in Portugal, and the Urban Planning and Environmental Protection agency of Greece²⁵ The main obstacles of these specialized agencies are limited financing mechanisms, the capacity of negotiation with other agents and administrations and the difficulties of maintaining cooperation among different municipalities, particularly in rapidly changing and uncertain political and social environments.

Examples of **informal** metropolitan governance structures are much more numerous, for several reasons. The first reason has to do with regional and cultural factors. There are approximately 361 metropolitan areas in the United States, for example; practically none function under a single multi-purpose governance structure, but rather, they work together according to various degrees and forms of cooperative arrangements. The second reason has to do with politics. As metropolitan areas grow in size and economic importance, higher levels of government may be wary of creating alternative power structures by institutionalizing municipal governance for large numbers of people. Third, many

differences and conflicts of interest exist among the many municipal governments and other local government agencies that make up a single metropolitan area. These differences are complicated by growth and competition and the fluidity of economic and social change. Finding the correct way of representing such diverse and sometimes transitory interests in a single structural “package” is difficult and often takes a number of attempts and revisions. Finally, many arguments have been made against formalization of governance relationships within large metropolitan areas. Letting different areas settle their own issues by voluntary means may give an optimal outcome on many fronts, particularly in relation to where people should wish to live, where businesses locate, and how and in what form they pay taxes for common services. The economic basis of this argument was originally proposed by Charles Tiebout in his seminal article written in 1956.²⁶ The most well-known examples of informal metropolitan governance structures in Latin America include Santiago in Chile, São Paulo in Brazil, Montevideo in Uruguay, Mexico City and Guadalajara in Mexico, but there are many others as well.

Governing for harmony in a city of cities

While recognizing that generalized recommendations and prescriptions are often inappropriate, that models are usually never directly transferable, and that the peculiarities of each case must be attended to, common challenges and characteristics for success in the governance of metropolitan areas begin to emerge from different cases and recent literature, and current research on the so-called “state of the art”, that can help to inform a policy dialogue on metropolitan governance.

Threshold requirements for good practice

How locally elected representatives and citizens democratically control the process of policy formulation and management functions of metropolitan governance is critical to determining their success and longevity. Inadequate popular local representation processes in metropolitan-level institutions creates tensions, particularly where stakeholders are excluded or accountability is called into question. If institutions lack legitimacy they are often short-lived.

Effective leadership is critical for overcoming fragmentation and building consensus across metropolitan areas. Strong leadership can overcome individualism and competition across political “turf” and build recognition that more metropolitan-wide collective action is empowering at both a national and an international level. In the case of Cape Town,²⁷ for example, strong collegial leadership and coalition-building are seen as critical to managing a complex set of relationships embedded in the fractured and highly contested ethnic and political dynamics within the Cape Town local, metropolitan and supra-metropolitan area. In Cape Town, there is currently an executive mayor, supported by an advisory mayoral committee. Members of the larger council, of which the committee is a

part, are elected every five years by a combination of ward elections and proportional representation. Elaborate attention to the processes of democratic local election gives legitimacy and visibility to the leadership of this single-tier metropolitan council that represents more than 3.5 million people who constitute 64 per cent of the total population of the Western Cape province and 78 per cent of the province's economy.

The ability to build consensus and coordinate actions among municipalities facilitates investments in infrastructure and amenities that make the metropolis more productive as a whole and more competitive internationally. Strong leadership in the affairs of metropolitan governance means not only building consensus, but also aggregating fragmented interests in a way that builds legitimacy and accountability to stakeholders in the process. When governance institutions are fragmented or are *ad hoc* creations, corrupt practices can gain strength. Where fragmentation exists, accountability practices are weakened, and individuals and networks can be more easily empowered and gain control over a policy sector.

Efficient financing is a core requirement for metropolitan governance. Deficient financing tools at the local level have often hampered metropolitan governance, and the redistribution of responsibilities among different levels of government has not always been sustained by a corresponding allocation of resources, empowerment or financing tools that would make it possible to raise the necessary funds. If such weaknesses are common at the level of individual municipalities, then the problems of raising finances to support broader metropolitan areas are compounded. Devolution of revenue-raising capacity by central and provincial or state governments to local

governments does not necessarily improve the financial powers for effective metropolitan governance. Indeed, municipal sub-units in metropolitan areas might gain power at the expense of the existing metropolitan governance structures. For example, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) actually became more dependent on central government grants following passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, which gave local government units within the broader metropolitan area the authority to collect a range of taxes. As a result, the MMDA lost a share of the local government units' regular income and its share in real property tax and other local tax revenues.²⁸

Highly fragmented governance arrangements in many metropolitan areas make efficient financing for area-wide service provision a difficult and ongoing challenge. Recent literature²⁹ suggests that this is true regardless of the metropolitan governance models in place. In general, municipalities are reluctant to transfer financial resources to metropolitan-level structures, and cooperative arrangements often break down in the absence of solid legal frameworks and constitutional support for revenue sharing with the metropolitan "tier" of governance. As a result, metropolitan authorities often lack adequate resources for governing and face difficulties in raising new resources.

Without a clear, permanent and sufficient financial mechanism, it is difficult for metropolitan areas to generate territorial solidarity through which to redress social and economic inequalities for more harmonious development. Some metropolitan areas have developed sustainable financial mechanisms to support policies and programming, including



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Amman, Jordan
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Lille, France, where the Funds of Solidarity and Economic Development redistribute revenue collected through local taxes; Berlin and Munich, Germany, where regional and state financial transfers fund metropolitan needs; the metropolitan areas of Helsinki, Finland, and Stockholm, Sweden, which have supportive local revenue tax systems; and Copenhagen, Denmark, which has a financial system funded through transport services.³⁰

Effective citizen participation in decision-making and in the allocation of resources across a multiplicity of metropolitan agencies is essential, but it can also be challenging to make the mechanisms of participation accessible, easily understood and representative, as required by the principles of transparency and democracy. In the case of Amman, Jordan³¹ a “Comprehensive Development Plan” is currently underway to address urban development to the year 2025. The first phase of the plan concerns the expansion of the city to link different socially distributed sites and territories around Amman under one administrative body; the goal of the plan is to better reflect the actual metropolitan area of the city, which has reached a vast 1,860 square kilometres. The city held public hearings and brainstorming sessions in 2007 during the preparation of the 2025 plan, but the targeted participants were not representative of the whole community. Moreover, the process implemented an informative participatory approach as opposed to an interactive one. Effective citizen participation is crucial for Amman’s successful growth, particularly as the metropolis’ expansion is driven by an influx of refugees. Palestinian refugees first flooded into Jordan as a result of the Arab

and Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967, then came refugees of the Lebanese Civil War in the 1970s, followed by Kuwaitis and others forced from their homes by the Gulf War in the 1980s. As a result of the Gulf Crisis of 1990, Amman has further absorbed a new wave of return migrants of Jordanian and Palestinian workers from Iraq and Kuwait, and most recently, as a result of the recent Iraq Crisis. UNHCR estimates that 700,000 Iraqis have moved to Amman since 2003. In addition, various socio-economic and geopolitical transformations in the region have made Amman a magnet for major real estate development projects with expensive high-rise buildings affecting the urban form of the city. In this context, effective citizen participation in strategic planning exercises is fundamental to the success of the Greater Amman Municipality.

The Challenges of Metropolitan Governance

Jurisdictional coordination is one of the most pressing challenges common to cities worldwide. This challenge takes two forms: vertical, multi-level jurisdictional coordination of services across multiple levels of government; and horizontal, inter-jurisdictional coordination of services across the metropolitan area. Where the former challenge exists, inter-governmental relations involved in the governance of cities are often in flux, with extensive and complex decentralization processes in motion in many countries worldwide. Multiple tiers of government and various levels of state agencies are involved in the affairs of urban governance, often at the expense



of municipal-level actors. Where the latter challenge exists, governing institutions are often fragmented, uncoordinated and in many cases *ad hoc*, owing to multiple jurisdictional and electoral boundaries that span the territories of vast metropolitan areas.

The case of Mumbai,³² India, illustrates the challenges of jurisdictional coordination in a complicated metropolitan environment. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) governs more than 12 million people³³ within a complex institutional structure of two wider metropolitan areas: an area defined as the Mumbai Urban Agglomeration, with 16.4 million people covering three districts of Maharashtra, including five municipal corporations and three municipal councils; and an even wider area, the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR), covering 4,355 square kilometres and including seven municipal corporations, 13 municipal councils, parts of neighbouring districts and more than 900 villages. The MCGM holds elections every five years, in which 227 councillors are directly elected from its wards, and the mayor and deputy mayor of the corporation are elected from amongst the councillors.

The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, however, is just one entity responsible for planning, development and provision of infrastructure in greater Mumbai. Other key agencies responsible for governance in Greater Mumbai include the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA). The MMRDA is responsible for the planning and development of the entire metropolitan region in a multi-municipal jurisdiction (7 municipal corporations, 13 municipal councils, parts of neighbouring districts and more than 900 villages). The MMRDA also brings together central and state governments to jointly fund urban development. Although the MMRDA Act specifically prohibits it from undertaking any work that falls under the obligatory or discretionary functions of the MCGM, the Act also gives it overriding power to direct any urban local authority. The result: the MMRDA and MCGM are often in conflict over jurisdictional responsibilities in infrastructure and service development matters. The MMRDA, for example, has been responsible for implementation of the Mumbai Urban Development Project, the Mumbai Urban Transport Project and the Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project.

This overlapping jurisdictional authority between the Greater Mumbai Metropolitan Corporation and the broader Metropolitan Regional Development Authority is complicated even more by the interplay of three other key agencies also responsible for governance and infrastructure in Mumbai: the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority and the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation. Each of these agencies performs key functions within the territory governed by the GMDC, and each has different legal status and operates under a complex system of authority. For example, the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority is a nominated body that operates through nine regional boards, three of which directly relate with Mumbai: the Housing and Area Development Board, the Mumbai Buildings Repair and

Reconstruction Board and the Mumbai Slum Improvement Board. On the other hand, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority has a different legal status and operates under a different system of authority. It has the status of a corporate entity, with the chief minister of Maharashtra as chairperson. It also has been declared a planning authority, so can function as a local authority for the slum areas under its jurisdiction.

To address metropolitan governance in Mumbai at this juncture requires a re-engineering of metropolitan governance processes, particularly with respect to reducing the multiplicity of agencies and improving jurisdictional coordination, as well as reforming accountability and transparency, improving interaction with citizens and developing appropriate information systems.

This complexity of jurisdictional responsibilities is further compounded in the case of Delhi, India, by the fact that it is the national capital. Metropolitan governance for the city region falls under the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD), consisting of nine urban districts and 27 subdivisions. There are no fewer than 98 urban bodies, local agencies, boards, and authorities serving the city's population of some 14 million people. The three major local authorities include the Delhi Municipal Corporation, the New Delhi Municipal Corporation and the Delhi Cantonment. In addition, the national government of India (in particular the central Ministries of Urban Development, Surface Transport, Environment, Home Affairs, and Defence), together with the state government of the National Capital Territories of Delhi, all exercise significant control over metropolitan governance in Delhi.

The most critical challenge of metropolitan governance confronting the government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) is the continued control by the central government of its administration and affairs. Major decisions for preparing and implementing the city's master plan are still taken by the Delhi Development Authority, a body corporate of the national Ministry of Urban Development. Frequent conflicts in governance arise as a result of this multiplicity of agencies of the central, state and local governments. Jurisdictional overlap, poor coordination, and lack of clarity over responsibilities for land-use planning, development, maintenance, and enforcement has resulted in ineffective and uncoordinated decision-making and actions in this rapidly growing metropolitan area of Delhi.

National and provincial or state governments, while part of the problem in cities such as Delhi, remain essential not only for empowering municipalities to enter into more effective metropolitan governing arrangements, but also for lending legitimacy to the political process and reinforcing metropolitan governance in the long term. In many countries where centralist attitudes towards local government are the norm, metropolitan governance arrangements are inhibited. National assemblies, senates, and other national governing institutions are also frequently in the hands of rural interests, while urban interests are often under-represented. This can result from national representation and electoral systems, or constitutional limitations to address urban



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questions. Decentralization aims to remedy this imbalance by systematically transferring functions and resources from central to local governments, thereby improving the provision of services and infrastructure to increase competitiveness and promote local economic growth.

Decentralization efforts can be hampered, however, when higher-level authorities meet these large metropolitan areas on the ground. The institutional structures for metropolitan governance and the institutions for planning and service delivery across urban territories are often fragmented. Governance of these broad territories is by discrete and often numerous municipal governments behaving independently and commonly lacking effective coordinating mechanisms for governing metropolitan areas. Decentralization of responsibilities and powers is therefore often delegated to the municipal structures already in place, even though they are not necessarily serving the metropolitan requirements well.

Effective metropolitan policies and strategies tend to reinforce coordination across different cities that make up the metropolitan area. Coordination is fundamental not only for administering basic needs in areas such as land, transport, environment, and related fiscal and funding solutions, but also

for addressing issues of poverty and social exclusion through innovative mechanisms of inter-territorial solidarity.

Land-use planning for spatial harmony is a key criterion of effective metropolitan governance. Both territorial and spatial strategies can be put to use for reducing social disparities. To that end, important functions of metropolitan institutions include land-use planning in peri-urban areas and urban hinterlands, transport development and related infrastructure planning at urban and regional levels. Spatial strategies differ depending on the growth patterns of metropolitan areas, some of which are rapidly gaining population, and others of which are growing slowly or not at all. Of those that are growing, some are consuming more land rapidly, and others are becoming increasingly dense.

Managing transport in large metropolitan areas is especially essential for the advancement of the urban economy and for giving residents access to jobs and services throughout the city region. However, transport investments and services are often implemented, financed, managed, and regulated by different governing institutions and levels of government. Coordination of these processes relies on complex intergovernmental policy networks and organizational management.

Social and economic harmony in cities

Metropolitan government arrangements can be instruments for addressing social cohesion by promoting economic opportunity, infrastructure investment, access to affordable transportation services, and investments in social housing across large metropolitan areas, thus crossing not just political divides but socio-economic ones.

However, institutional fragmentation of metropolitan areas is closely related to the escalating problem of social segregation and disharmony in the world's cities. The Kolkata Metropolitan Area (KMA) in India, for example, is projected to host more than 20 million people in 2025, compared to the present population of more than 15 million. The KMA consists of three municipal corporations, 38 other municipalities, 77 non-municipal census towns, 16 outgrowths, and 445 rural areas, covering about 1,850 square kilometres. Kolkata faces serious deficiencies in urban infrastructure and services, and also faces spatial inequalities spread across the KMA. The high incidence of poverty and inherent spatial inequality poses great challenges to overcoming the lack of coordination across agencies concerned with the provision of housing and services in the metropolitan area.

In the Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte, Brazil,³⁴ which consists of 34 municipalities and has a population of nearly 5 million people, serious inequalities exist between developed and less developed parts of the urban region. Concern about the vast disparities in the area prompted the government of the state of Minas Gerais (the current effective

senior government level of the urban region) to partner with the Cities Alliance to conduct research and develop plans for the alleviation of poverty in 16 municipalities in the north zone of the region.³⁵ Indeed, one of the major reasons for the recent establishment of the metropolitan region was to develop policies and programmes that could reduce inequalities in the region. To provide a basis for this approach, the state government of Minas Gerais has, since 2006, been working on legislation to create a number of major metropolitan agencies to deal with public functions of common interest, such as inter-municipal transportation, the road system, basic sanitation, land use, exploitation of water resources, preservation of the environment, housing, health, and socio-economic development. The formal structures have been reinforced by a number of initiatives by both civil society and the city council of Belo Horizonte.

Clearly, metropolitan governance can help address social and economic imbalances within cities. Creating harmony in a “city of cities” requires a “shared vicinity”³⁶ that is expressed through political will, financial participation and willingness to create redistribution mechanisms to redress social and economic imbalances produced by the development process and regional and global factors.

Harmony between the built and the natural environment

Managing metropolitan environmental resources such as natural watersheds that spread throughout the jurisdictional territories of several local governments also focuses attention



▲ Street market in Bangalore, India
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on the need to coordinate and overcome the problems of fragmentation in local political institutions. Commonly shared natural resources such as rivers and lakes that span multiple jurisdictions also require new forms of governance to support and protect them.

Urban metropolitan areas demand and consume vast amounts of energy, water and other material resources, and as a result continuously transform and place pressure on the physical environment. Cities are both victims and perpetrators of climate change. They generate the lion's share of solid waste, electricity demand, transport-related emissions, and demand for heating and cooling. On the other hand, cities

and local governments are well positioned to set the standards for healthy, safe, pollution-free environments and to take a leadership role in addressing the challenges related to hazard management as countries adapt to climate change.³⁷

Planning for environmental harmony is dependent upon metropolitan governance institutions that effectively span multiple jurisdictions. The challenge for metropolitan institutions to effectively protect, manage and plan for physical environments that span multiple jurisdictions and build environmental harmony across broad metropolitan territories is a core challenge for metropolitan governance worldwide.

NOTES

¹ Friedmann, 2007.

² Borja, 2004.

³ Research in this area includes the studies of McGee & Robinson, 1995; *Environment and Urbanization*, 2000; Myers & Dietz, 2002; National Research Council, 2003; Rojas et al., 2005; Laquian, 2005; *Public Administration and Development*, 2005).

⁴ Angel, Sheppard & Civco, 2005.

⁵ McCarney, 2005.

⁶ Cameron, 2005.

⁷ Stren, 2007.

⁸ Sorensen, 2001, p. 22.

⁹ Hamilton, 1999.

¹⁰ Data for urban agglomerations from UN Population Division's *World Urbanization Prospects 2007*.

¹¹ Borja, 2004.

¹² This mode of operation is quite usual in the cases of dissolution of metropolitan governments such as London and Barcelona. It is also found in some Australian cities such as Bristol, Perth and Sidney, where the coordination is done by the state governments.

¹³ Webster, 2004.

¹⁴ The case material on China is drawn from *Study on Metropolitan Governance in China*, 2008, an unpublished survey prepared by Suocheng Dong as background case work for UN-HABITAT as part of an exercise on metropolitan governance.

¹⁵ UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006.

¹⁶ Ha & Wong, 1999.

¹⁷ UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2006.

¹⁸ Scarpaci, 2002, p. 191.

¹⁹ Cameron, 2005.

²⁰ Schmidt & Kaplen, 2008.

²¹ Stren, 2007.

²² Jones, 1942, and later, Sharpe, 1995.

²³ The mechanism of coordination of the Stadsregio in Rotterdam varies according to the objectives of the cooperation.

²⁴ Lefèvre, 2007.

²⁵ Borja, 2004, p. 48.

²⁶ Tiebout, 1956.

²⁷ The case material on Cape Town used in this chapter is drawn from background case work prepared for UN-HABITAT by D. Schmidt and A. Kaplan.

²⁸ Laquian, 2002.

²⁹ Klink, 2007; Lefèvre, 2007; National Research Council, 2003; Slack, 2007; Stren, 2007.

³⁰ Borja, 2004.

³¹ The case material on Jordan used in this chapter is drawn from "Policy Analysis for Metropolitan Governance in the City of Amman" (March 2008), an unpublished survey prepared by Maram Rawil and Yasser Rajjal as background case work for UN-HABITAT as part of an exercise on metropolitan governance.

³² The case material on India used in this chapter is drawn from a survey. "Metropolitan Governance in India: Case Studies of Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata" (2008), an unpublished document prepared by Vinod Tewari as background case work for UN-HABITAT as part of an exercise on metropolitan governance.

³³ Population statistics for Mumbai and Delhi, India, are derived from the 2001 census. In 2007, the UN Population Division, however, estimated the population of Mumbai to be 18.9 million, making it the fifth largest urban agglomeration in the world, after Tokyo, Mexico City, New York-Newark and São Paulo.

³⁴ The case material on Brazil used in this chapter is drawn from "Metropolitan Governance Survey" (March 2008), an unpublished document prepared as background casework for UN-HABITAT as part of an exercise on metropolitan governance.

³⁵ This material is from "Questionnaire on Metropolitan Governance: RMBH" by Observatorio das Metropoles of Minas Gerais (2008), p. 7.

³⁶ Borja, 2004.

³⁷ World Bank, 2007b.