Social Capital and Ordinary Social Movement in Urban China:

A Case Study of Community Movement in Shanghai

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Introduction

Since the 1990s, with the market-oriented economic reform and decentralization, China's local government agencies have been more and more interest-oriented in their action. Local states, as well as some commercial organizations, often excessively exploit local resources (e.g, Lu,1999; Chen,2000), which is incompatible with citizens' interests. Therefore, contemporary China's citizens also often launch collective resistances to defend their interests or rights in both rural and urban China. Different from large-scale political movements such as 1989 Tiananmen Movement, these grassroots resistances are mainly directed at local authorities or enterprises, and they focus on specific economic or social problems instead of abstract political claims. However, they also impose great impacts on the grassroots governance of the party state. To understand the social and political order of contemporary China, we have to explore the mechanisms of grassroots movements.

The Study of Contemporary China's Collective Resistance

In the mainstream theories of social movement, resource mobilization model, political process model focus on examining the mechanisms of collective resistances (McCarthy& Zald, 1973, 1987; Tilly, 1978; McAdam,1982; Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1994）while new social movement theory highlights their "cultural" claims[1]（Habermas, 1987：Offe, 1985; Castells, 1976：Touraine, 1981、1988）. However, these theories are based on and reflect the social context of liberal political systems in Western states, and they may be not completely applicable to explain China's collective resistances which are under the authoritarian context. In present urban China, ordinary social movement participated by cross-class citizens and the

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[1] Therefore, researchers seldom employ new social movement theory to explain China's grassroots movements which generally focus on specific problems.

"right-defense" movement[2] participated by "weak" groups of workers or peasants are the two types of collective resistances that break out most frequently (Liu, 2004:67). These two types of China's community-level movement are different from Western social movements in terms of nature. According to David Aberle(1966), Western social movements can be classified into four types: transformative movements, reformative movements, redemptive movements and alterative movements(see Giddens, 1997:p511-513). They are aimed to promote either macro social change or micro individual improvement. However, both ordinary social movements and "right-defense" movements are aimed to defend group rights or to resolve specific public problems at the level of neighborhood. Partly similar to "right-defense" movements, ordinary social movements are also directed against local authorities or enterprises who inviolate citizens' interests or rights. However, their participants include citizens from different class backgrounds, and they are sometimes proactive movements[3].

Presently, the dynamics of ordinary social movements in the new context of urban governance[4] are not adequately understood. One the one hand, most of existing studies on China's collective resistance focus on examining "right-defense" movements, and they suggest that the improved legislation, the tolerance of high-ranking authorities are the "political opportunity structure" that promote the rise of collective resistance (O'Brien & Li, 1995; O'Brien, 1996; Cai, 2002;Yu，2004a). However, they can not adequately explain why citizens in some neighborhoods are more active and successful in collective resistance than those in other neighborhoods who face the same problems and the similar social situations. On the other hand, present studies on both Western social movements and China's "right-defense" movements suggest that social networks are responsible for the mobilization of

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[2] What are called "right-defense" movements refer to the collective resistances that are to "seek redress of routine instances of injustice for which the government and its agents are responsible" (Pei, 2000, p25). They often focus on economic issues of weak groups, such as protesting against over-levied taxations, or asking for compensation for resettlement, etc . And they are generally reactive and defensive.

[3] According to Charless Tilly (1978), proactive movements are aimed to claim for new rights. In contrast, reactive movements are generally aimed to resist against agents of the state to defend group rights.

[4] With the shift towards a more market-oriented economy, China's urban grassroots governance has moved from a system based on state work-units to one based on neighborhoods which are led by local authorities (e.g. see Wu, 2000).

collective action (Snow, Louis and Sheldon,1980; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Dieter & Gern, 1993; Ying,2001; Cai,2002：Lee, 2000）.However, most of them focus on examining the role of horizontal networks between citizen protesters themselves without looking at the support they may have received from high-ranking governments. Therefore, it remains unknown why some citizen protesters can succeed in getting support from state authorities while others fail to do so. Existing literature suggests that personal vertical networks are important channels for China's citizens to informally participate in or influence politics (Walder, 1986;Oi ,1989). Therefore, we need explore the role of vertical networks in collective resistance. In other words, the present models of "political process" and "resource mobilization" are inadequate in their ability to explain the rise and subsequent outcomes of ordinary social movements.

Based on a case study, this project examines the dynamics of ordinary social movements in urban China. Specifically, this article addresses the following questions regarding this type of collective resistance: 1. why are citizens in certain neighborhoods more active and successful in launching collective resistance than citizens in other neighborhoods who face similar problems? 2. how do they undertake collective action through horizontal and vertical ties with other people or organizations? 3. what strategies do different actors in the movement adopt in order to promote the odds against their opponents? The article should cover these knowledge gaps by representing a community movement.

Social Capital: A Concept Tool for Interpreting Collective Action

Although researchers define social capital in different ways, most of them regard social network and trust as the core components of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986：Coleman，1988S; Putnam，1993; Fukuyama, 1995). Some social capital theorists also split social capital into bonding, bridging and linking social capital. Both bonding and bridging social capital are based on horizontal ties between people with similar socio-political status (Gittell and Vidal 1998, Putnam 2000) while linking social capital refers to the vertical links

"between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society" (Szreter1 & Woolcock, 2003: p6). In this study, the concept of horizontal networks, vertical links and trust, which are main components of social capital, will be employed to explain the dynamics of ordinary social movement.

Research Method: Comparative Case Study and Process Tracing

The method of comparative case study is employed in this project. This movement broke out in two connected residential neighborhoods. They are under the same social circumstances, and are also similar to each other in terms of their main internal characteristics such as the formation of residential building and the characteristics of population which may influence community politics. However, in the movement, the collective resistance of one neighborhood lasted shortly and failed while that of the other sustained ten years and succeeded in the end. With long-term investigation, I find that they are different from each other mainly in the "stock" of social capital[5] within them. Therefore, by comparing these two neighborhoods to each other, this project can "control" other variables that may affect the community politics, and focus on examining the link between social capital and the collective resistance. Furthermore, to disclose the complicated process of this game and its dynamics, I also employ the method of process tracing to analyze the casual mechanisms that how social capital works in ordinary social movement.

In the past five years, I conducted more than eighty open-ended interviews and engaged in a total ten-month non-participant observation to gain an understanding of the motivation and attitude of main actors in this movement. My interviewees include local officials, leaders of community associations, movement activists and ordinary residents. I also collected comprehensive documents about the movement which are provided by the local government, movement activists and some mass media.

A Story of the North Green Neighborhood: A Ten-year Community Movement

Green Neighborhood: a cross-class residential neighborhood

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[5]Within one neighborhood, there are more formal civil associations and denser informal ties among residents than those within the other neighborhood. I will explain this later.

Green Neighborhood is located in the W Street, N District, Shanghai City, and it was developed by the government at the end of the 1980s. Green I Sub-neighborhood (hereafter GI) and Green II Sub-neighborhood (hereafter GII), where the community movement broke out, constitute the north part of Green Neighborhood, and they are administered by GI Residents' Committee (RC) and GII RC respectively. Within these two sub-neighborhoods are many six-storey residential buildings, and twelve high residential buildings more than twenty storey around an 8000-square-meter unused land, on which was planned to build a central community park. Most part of the planned park is located in GII. There are nearly 3500 residents in GI and GII respectively, and their components are also very similar and are cross-class ones in terms of their economic status. Most employed residents are factory workers, different ranking government officials, entrepreneur managers, private businessmen, and teachers from different level of schools, and so on.

Since the early 1990s, with the opening and development of N District, the land value of Green Neighborhood has been increasing due to its good geographical location. Many local power holders coveted and attempted several times to occupy part of the land of the community park. Therefore, from 1993 to 2003, residents in the north Green Neighborhood launched a community movement that intermittently lasted ten years to protect their community park from expropriation. The first phase of this movement was against one estate developer, and the second was directed at the local government.

The resistance against the estate developer: the origin of community movement

The lack of trust and the failure of the initial collective resistance

In 1993, an estate developer, which was a state-owned developing company subordinate to Shanghai Municipal Government, sought to occupy part of the unused land to build a 26-storey residential building for sale. This project seriously disturbed Mrs Fang, who is a retired teacher living in GII, because the newly-planned high building would hide her home from sunshine. In addition, it would occupy a lot of land that had been planned to build the community park on. Therefore, she attempted to get acquainted with some heads of resident

group[6] in the north Green Neighborhood and persuaded them to call on 37 residents to join her resistance against the developer. They collectively appealed (*jiti shangfang*)[7] to the District Government and requested the latter to stop the project. The developer then spread a piece of rumor that Fang would compromise with them secretly because she had accepted gifts from them. Due to their original unfamiliarity with and vulnerable trust to Fang, many GII ordinary participants were convinced of that and very angry to Fang's "betrayal"; and they would not join collective resistance any more. The collapse of the trust between the protest leader and followers led to the lack of further collective resistance in GII.

The transference of leadership of the community movement

The rest of protest activists realized that a reliable and able leader was most important to the success of the resistance. Then, an activist of GI recommended one of his "trustworthy" neighbors, Mr. Tan, who was a low-ranking administrator of a bazaar in his forties at that time. In the high JZ Building where this activist lived in, many residents including Tan were collectively resettled in by government (*jiti dongqian*) from the same downtown area, and they knew each other well before. This activist believed that Tan would be a good leader of their resistance, for Tan experienced collective action many times during the Cultural Revolution; and he also had a lot of friends including some government officials who might be helpful in their future action. Persuaded by these neighbor activists, Tan agreed to be the new leader of the movement. Mr. Tan believed that they need ampler and stronger evidence to argue against the developer. Discussing together with his neighbors, he found that this project might not conform to the construction regulations. Since the 1980s, the state has begun to propagate and emphasize the policy of "rule by law". Tan believed that if they could find strong evidence proving that the estate developer had violated the construction law on this project, they might urge high-ranking authorities to punish the developer and suspend the

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[6] China's resident committees usually divide the households under their administration into resident groups and appoint enthusiastic residents as heads of such groups, who are supposed to help the resident committees to administer residents in their groups. Due to this, heads of such group are usually quite familiar with and trusted by residents.
[7] This is usually the relatively economical and effective channel available for powerless China residents to argue against local power holders who invade their interests (See O'Brien & Li, 1995; Cai, 2002)

project by citing the law[8]. Therefore, he tried his best to look for such evidence through personal networks. On the other hand, he also attempted to utilize his connections with his former neighbors to mobilize local residents to join him in collective action. As Tan pointed out when he talked about his struggle experiences to me: "law and public relations (*gongguan*) are the most important things to the resistance... "[9] Actually, for these protesters, law was only employed to legitimize the movement and to put pressure on government agencies while social capital is the mainly mean by which they constructed their resistance. We will find this in the later description of the movement history.

Due to Tan's persuasion and encouragement, many residents living in the JZ Building, especially his former neighbors, agreed to join him and became loyal supporters to him during the later ten-year community movement. Furthermore, by the "secret" help of a high-ranking government official, Tan got a copy of the original neighborhood construction plan of Green Neighborhood, and he found that this controversial building is not included in this legally approved plan.

Collective action and the success of the resistance against the developer

Tan reported this evidence to the N District Government agency; but the latter chose to believe in the developer which is auxiliary to the municipal government. Therefore, given the illegal nature of this project, protesters decided that they could do something radical to stop it. On the night of June 15, 1994, protest activists called on several hundred residents to destroy the project. To prevent the developer from resuming it, they also attempted to request

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[8] Tan and other protest activists name this "substantiating strategy " (*jiaozhen celue*). Essentially, this strategy is similar to the strategies labeled as 'rightful resistance'(O'Brien,1996) or "struggle by law" (Yu, 2004a).

[9] Chinese people often relate "public relations" to the local concept of *guanxi*. Actually, what Tan refers here is to construct and utilize social networks or personal connections. These networks include not only such "*guanxi*" as the personal ties between relatives, colleagues, friends, but also some "public networks" like mass media. Furthermore, for Tan and other activists, it is good thing to utilize personal connections for the public benefits of the community, and this is different from that people to seek for personal interests by *guanxi*. In other words, the connotation of *guanxi* cannot cover the horizontal networks, vertical links and trust that Tan employed in collective action while these components are part of social capital. That is why I employ the concept of social capital rather than *guanxi* to refer the connections that the protesters utilized.

high-ranking authorities to revoke the project for ever. On the one hand, Tan appealed to some mass media, especially *Wenhui Newspaper,* about this matter [10]. Since Shanghai Municipal Government had highlighted the significance of environment issues before, *Wenhui Newspaper* and other media investigated in this project and broadcasted its illegal nature. On the other hand, by his official friends, Tan got to know about the work schedules and the office locations of the Shanghai Municipal Construction Planning Bureau (hereafter SMCPB), which is charge of approving all construction plans under the jurisdiction of Shanghai City. In the following days, he organized residents to flood several important sectors of the SMCPB accusing the developer of its project without legal approval. Disturbed and pressured by residents' continuous collective appeals, the SMCPB had to promise to investigate this project as soon as possible.

Although the developer tried to discredit Tan as they did to Fang before, residents didn't believe their rumor of Tan. A few days later, the SMCPB issued an official order to cancel the project.

The growth up of social capital within the community

By appealing to the mass media, movement activists also succeeded in urging the local government to construct the planned community park in May 1995. In the following two years, local residents enjoyed a happy leisure time on this park, which brought the neighborhood very good reputation.

The first phase of the community movement greatly improved various social relationships between people in the north Green Neighborhood, especially in GI. Firstly, the success of the collective resistance promoted the level of trust within the community. On the

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[10] Since the 1990s, the government control on the mass media has been not so strict as before. Usually, mass media can broadcast some social problems including those of local power holders. Such broadcast may affect the public opinion and thus urge high-ranking government agencies to deal with such problems because of their concern of legitimacy or criticism from their superiors. Some mass media affiliated to high-ranking authorities even have the power to require local government agencies to provide assistance in investigating influential events; and they may report these events in inner circulations (*neican or qingkuang huibao*), which are only read by the high-ranking officials, to have their attention on important issues. Therefore, many people may appeal to the media to get attention from high-ranking authorities when they suffer unfair matters. In Shanghai, *Wenhui Newspaper* affiliated to the municipal government is such politically influential newspapers.

one hand, successful in leading the protest, Tan was granted a high level of trust by residents. On the other hand, the movement also led to significant increasing of the amount of interactions and the level of trust between ordinary participants. Secondly, in the processes of collective resistance, informal networks of activists appeared within the community. Almost in every residential building, there emerged some activists who have different gender, careers and political identities, etc. These informal networks allowed Tan to easily mobilize residents for collective action. Especially, in the JZ Building where Tan lived in, the number of activists was the most outstanding. In 1996, with the encouragement from the government, residents in the JZ Building actively established the Home Owners' Committee[11] of JZ Building (JZHC), and they elected Tan its head. Thirdly, the many times of the collective resistance promoted the formation of the norms for participation. The success convinced many residents of the low risk of such collective resistance, which became the collective memory of the community. In other words, in Green Neighborhood, especially in GI, a "tradition" of right-defense by law was thus constructed, and many residents regarded participating in collective action as duty. Most importantly, through a series of collective appeals, Tan succeeded in seeking support from the mass media and high-ranking authorities, and he henceforth managed to establish personal connections with some officials and journalists.

Therefore, the collective resistance contributed to the enhancement of both individual social capital of protest leader and collective social capital within the north Green Neighborhood, especially within GI. This constituted the dynamic of the future cooperation between residents. The trust and networks between participants, and the norm of community participation within the neighborhood are the "bonding social capital" while the vertical connections between protest activists and municipal officials and journalists are the "linking social capital".

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[11] Since the middle of the 1990s, the state began to implement the reform of home property and required residents to buy homes themselves instead of asking for homes from work units as before. The government also encouraged residents to elect their representatives to constitute home owners' committee, whose obligations are to deal with the affairs that are related to homes and to oversee the work of housing management companies (see Read, 2003).

The collective resistance against local government: the highlight of movement

Whose park? the contest between administering power and citizen rights

In 1997，without any legal approval, the N District Government decided to confiscate 1300 square meters of the park to construct a entertainment center for senior cadre. As its branch, the W Street Office was entrusted to be charge of this project. They claimed that the park was owned by the state; and that, as the representative of the state, the local government had the power to confiscate the park. Most former movement activists were very upset by this. They believed that the park was part of the public amenities of their residential buildings, and should be the property of local residents; that the local government had no authority to occupy the land without legal approval. Therefore, Tan and other activists decided to launch resistance against the local government to defend their "rights of property and environment".

Movement elites also understood that the opponent they would confront with this time was the powerful local government[12]. Therefore, they must find good justifications for whatever they would do. However, given the fact that this project conflicted with the regulations about public greeneries and residents' housing property rights, Tan believed it would be possible for them to succeed in the resistance if their strategies were appropriate. To eliminate residents' awe to the local government, activists comprehensively propagated relevant laws and regulations in the neighborhood and attempted to convince residents of the rightness of fighting for their citizen rights. Therefore, many residents supported activists with their action.

Collective charge and visited by policemen

At that time, including the ZBHC, nine home owners' committees have been established in the north Green Neighborhood, six of them were in GI and well organized. To enhance the legitimacy of their protest and to reduce the risk of being labeled as "mobs", Tan decided to organize collective resistance under the name of these formal resident associations. He visited important members of these home owners' committees one by one and persuaded them to

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[12] The N District is special in Shanghai city in terms of its status, and its government has been granted much privileges. In practice, the N District Government often ignores the regulations of municipal-ranking governmental agencies.

participate in the resistance. Since then, an informal alliance was established among these home owners' committees, and Tan was elected leader of this alliance. Then, Tan visited *Wenhui Newspaper* to complain the local government of its illegal project, and submitted the appeal letter endorsed by the nine home owners' committees. *Wenhui Newspaper* then reported the case to the municipal government. Concerned with the stability of the area, the latter ordered the local government to suspend the project.

The W Street Office then requested to negotiate with these nine home owners' committees. Both parties reached a consensus that the local government could continue the project; but this building should be open to both senior cadre and local residents as well, and that the occupied land area of the park should not exceed 650 square meters. However, the N District Government dismissed this agreement. Without informing residents, they set a new construction plan that will occupy 2000 square-meter park. April 1999, the local government restarted the project.

By personal connections with officials, Tan found that the local government had broken their negotiation agreement. Movement elites felt deceived and were very angry. They not only appealed to high-ranking authorities but also reported the treachery of local government to mass media. Furthermore, Tan also decided to adopt more radical strategies. On the 25th May 1999, Tan led hundreds of residents to destroy the construction base without damaging the construction equipment. This forced the local government to suspend the project. What is important here is that Tan had earlier sought advices from a public safety officer, who is his intimate friend. The officer suggested that there should be no big problem only if they don't damage the equipment. The resident protests followed this boundary in their action, which made the local government fail to find strong evidence of their "damaging state property".

After this incident, the W Street Office threatened to arrest Tan and other activists. The latter then decided to appeal directly to the Shanghai Municipal Government and to draw attention from its top leaders. By consulting his official friends, Tan understood the importance of the timing for their collective appeal. Due to the social memory of the 1989 Tiananmen Event, the dates closing to 4th June were sensitive period of Chinese politics. Any

events happening on such dates would trigger high attention from all level of governments. If they went to the municipal government in the daytime or on dates too close to 4th June, the impact would be too big, which would disgrace and infuriate Shanghai Municipal Government. Therefore, the optimal time must be appropriate so that the appeal would attract high attention from top leaders of Shanghai on the one hand, but not threaten their authority on the other. Therefore, these protestors chose a relatively sensitive time- the night of 1st June- for their collective appeal to the municipal government. This action proved to be quite effective. The Shanghai Municipal Government immediately informed the local government about it and warned the latter to deal with this matter carefully. Regarding the time choice of the residents' appeal, the local government was very shocked and scared. On the second day, local officials accompanied by policemen visited Tan and other movement elites' homes, and warned them of their action. The home visit accompanied with policemen triggered more anger of movement activists. To prevent them from initiating more collective appeals before 4st June, the local government had to order a lot of officials and policemen to watch on in front of both the JZ Building and that of Shanghai Municipal Government.

Since the collective resistance was organized under the name of home owners' committees, the local government proclaimed that they would be more dangerous than *Falungong* organizations. However, *Wenhui Newspaper*'s investigation report showed that it was the fault of the local government in the conflict. The municipal government would not believe in the latter's explanations. Therefore, the local government didn't dare to punish movement elites and to resume the project.

"The Guard of Greeneries": honor title from high-ranking government agency

In Feb 2000, due to the influences of Tan's leading the long-term movement of protecting the park, one leader of the Shanghai Municipal Garden and Forestry Management Bureau (SMGFMB), who is also Tan's friend, proposed to award him with the honor title of "the Guard of Greeneries". Influential TV stations and newspapers in Shanghai also broadcasted the movement and Tan's leading role. The encouragement and support from the high-ranking authority and mass media greatly inspired Tan and other activists, and granted

the resistance with more legitimacy.

The Struggle Strategies of Both Parties

The Local Government's Strategy

Because of Tan's leading role in the movement, the local government attempted to attack on him. On the one hand, they proclaimed that they construct this building in order to provide entertainment facilities for local old residents. On the other hand, they not only tried to draw some activists to their side by giving presents, but also ordered GI RC and GII RC to disintegrate local residents' trust to Tan, and to collapse the alliance of home owners' committees by fomenting discord between them and Tan.

Some of these tactics took effects. Due to the persuasion of GIRC secretary, who had personal connections with important members of home owners' committees, most of them withdrew their support to Tan. Several former activists including vice head of the JZHC turned around to speak good things of the local government. They not only criticized Tan for his "radical" position publicly but also released Tan's plan of action to the local government. This hit and frustrated Tan heavily.

The Countermeasures of Protest Leader

Tan would not give in. He believed that once he lost the struggle, his reputation would be collapsed; more seriously, the collective resistance might be defined as illegal one, and all his supporters would thus suffer this because of their supporting action. Fortunately, unlike Fang, even in the worst situation, Tan had tens of loyal neighbors and some official friends who were always assisting him in collective action. Therefore, Tan decided to fight back.

Since the alliance between formal home owners' committee was disintegrated, Tan turned to construct countermeasures by informal ties. On the one hand, he attempted to unmask the "lies" of the W Street Office. Through the vertical ties with his official friends, Tan almost collected all the important local government documents of their secret plans. Then, he released these evidences to journalists and local residents. He proclaimed that, as head of the JZHC, he had the obligation to defend citizen's rights which had been granted by law. As a result, some journalists who supported the local government before turned to the side of Tan.

Many residents turned around to be unsatisfied with the local government.

On the other hand, Tan also called for over 200 residents to sigh another appeal letter in September 2000. Then he organized some loyal activists to collectively appeal to high-ranking government agencies again and again. By his personal ties with official friends, Tan also got his appeal letters sent to many central government agencies, and the latter instructed the Shanghai Municipal Government to deal with the matter seriously. The municipal government worried about this, and it required the local government to cancel the project. However, the latter delayed the order with many excuses.

In 2001 and 2002, Tan was honored the title of "the Guard of Greeneries" again. Until 2003, both parties were totally tired of the dispute. With the intervening from high-ranking authorities, the local government compromised with movement activists and rebuilt the park.

Social Capital as Weapon of the Powerless Residents

The differences between neighborhoods towards collective resistance

The larger part of this contested park is located in GII, and it is therefore more relevant to the interests of GII residents. However, the success of the movement is mainly because of the efforts of GI residents. Due to the sparse networks and weak trust between the GII protest leader and ordinary participants, their resistance was easily disintegrated by the developer. This also resulted in the lack of more collective action. In contrast, the trust between GI protest leader and ordinary participants was very strong due to the long-term connections between them. This sustained the collective resistance in GI for many years. Secondly, another big difference between GII and GI was that there were mach more well-organized home owners' committees in the latter. These formal civil associations granted the legitimacy of collective resistance greatly. Thirdly, compared to Fang, Tan was also more successful in employing vertical links to seek support from high-ranking authorities and mass media. Therefore, because GI protestors had more "stock" of social capital and they could wield social capital better than GII residents, the former were thus more successful in the movement.

The role of social capital in residents' construction of their resistance

To relatively powerless residents, social capital is the main weapon for their collective resistance. 1,*To Mobilize both Protest Leaders and Participants.* In this community movement, Tan's leading role is very important to its success. However, except for his neighbors' persuasion, Tan agreed to lead the movement also because he believed that he would be able to organize strong resistance against the local power holders by his personal social capital. Actually, he was very successful in doing this. Therefore, social capital was responsible for mobilizing both leaders and ordinary residents to launch the community movement. 2,*To Get Support from State Authority.* The vertical networks between citizen protesters and high-ranking authorities affected the community movement significantly. Firstly, due to such connections, protests can approach and seek for support from state authority. Secondly, the vertical connections are very helpful for protestors to find out the "boundaries" of collective action. Therefore, although they destroyed the construction site violently and appealed to the municipal government in sensitive time, they did not damage the construction equipment and did not disgrace the municipal government, and they were thus not seriously punished. Thirdly, partly because of personal vertical networks, Tan was awarded the honor title of "the Guard of Greenery". This granted him with the legitimacy of organizing resistance. 3,*To Collect Information or Evidence.* Due to Tan's personal connections with some officials, they often released the decisions and plans of the local government to him, which was very helpful for him in preparing timely countermeasures. By these connections, he also collected the original construction plan and local government documents, which were vital for him in disclosing the illegal nature of those projects of the local power holders. Such disclosure not only discredited the local authorities, but also provided a strong basis for protesters to urge high-ranking authorities to cancel these projects.

Authoritarian but disaggregated state as the institutional context for social capital to work

In contemporary China, there is institutional necessity and feasibility for powerless citizens to employ informal mean of social capital. Due to the authoritarian nature of the state, the legal system within it does not work well. Usually, when power holders break law or regulations,

they are seldom punished in accordance with law. Therefore, in this movement, when facing the local power holders who violated citizens' interests, it was difficult for powerless citizens to resolve their problems by charging the former on court. That was the main reason that citizens needed to employ informal social capital to construct their resistance.

On the other hand, the state is "split" because there is a lot of "cleavage" within the administrative system (e.g.Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; Bernstein &Lu¨ , 2000). This makes it feasible for powerless citizens to employ informal ties to mobilize high-ranking authorities to support them in resisting against local states. However, all civil protesters cannot exploit such "cleavage" because the latter are usually hidden from ordinary citizens, or citizens don't know how to exploit it even they know its existence. Therefore, citizens need something like "bridges" by which they can know the existence of such "cleavage", and learn strategies of exploiting it, which is illustrated by the case of this movement. Actually, there were a lot of contradictions between some municipal government sectors and the local government of the N District. The former were quite unsatisfied to the privileges of the local government because the latter threatened their authority. Different from other citizen protesters, movement activists in GI were quite aware of such gaps through their personal vertical ties with government officials, and they could thus make full use of these "opportunities". At the beginning, due to the privileges of the local government, municipal government sectors would not confront with it publicly. However, Tan and other activists continuously reported not only the illegal nature of the project of the local government but also its contemptuous attitudes towards the municipal government sectors to the SMUPB and the SMGFMB. The latter felt insulted and thus chose to support resident protesters in all kinds of ways. Such support from high-ranking authorities not only instilled confidence to GI protestors, but also led to the withdrawal of the local government from its project in the end. Therefore, with the existence of the "cleavage" within the administrative system, citizen protestors could utilize vertical networks to mobilize part of the state against another, by which they were able to win their collective resistance.

Social Capital and Ordinary Social Movement

In contemporary China, collective resistances against local authorities are rising and falling, and this becomes an important issue in grassroots politics. This study examines the dynamics of ordinary social movement. It finds that the existence of widespread dissatisfaction among citizens and that of "political opportunity structure" are the prerequisites for ordinary social movements to break out and to succeed. Widespread dissatisfaction is presently accumulating in urban China, and may trigger many types of collective action (Liu, 2004:p60). One main reason for such is that the reform of state-owned enterprises has caused many workers to be laid off and their family to live very hard life (Lee, 2000; Chen, 2000; Liu, 2004). Another very serious problem is the conflicts between citizens and the alliances between local political and economical power holders, which is reflected in land expropriation and home resettlement projects(e.g, Song & Zhou &Cui,2003); and many citizens with different class backgrounds are involved in such conflicts. Because these problems are often related to the corruption of local officials(eg. Lu, 1999; Chen, 2000), they resulted in the general reduction of citizens' trust to local authorities[13]. This may make many urban citizens psychologically inclined to participate in protest. One the other hand, there also have emerged "political opportunity structure" that can be exploited to facilitate the collective resistance: the "cleavage" within the administration system, the little relaxation of governmental control of the mass media, and the gradual improvement of legislation. The "cleavage" within the administration system makes it feasible for powerless citizens to utilize informal ties to seek for support from high-ranking authorities. The improvement of legislation provides "weapon" for citizens to fight for their rights and interests. And the relatively relaxed mass media can affect the public opinion and put pressure on local authorities.

This study highlights that good mobilization strategies are vital to the success of ordinary social movements. The existence of widespread dissatisfaction among citizens and

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[13]There is a Chinese saying spread in many areas: "the central government is citizens' benefactor; the province government is like citizens' relatives… the local government is citizens' enemy"(also see Ying，2001:p105). This saying vividly reflects the citizens' high distrust to local authorities.

that of "political opportunity structure" are not adequate for collective resistance to emerge. Elaborately-designed mobilization strategies are needed to promote potential or psychological resistance into actual collective action, and to lead to success. This study finds that horizontal ties are responsible not only in mobilizing ordinary citizens into ordinary social movement, but also in promoting protest leaders to emerge.

Most importantly, this study brings to light of the key role of vertical links between citizens and high-ranking authorities in ordinary social movements. It finds that movement elites can master struggle tactics well by consulting government officials through their personal vertical links. Furthermore, the vertical links that movement elites wielded are also helpful for them to collect information and evidence, and to get support from the state. In addition, the existence of such vertical links will also instill participants with confidence and consolidate the horizontal networks between them and movement elites during the long period of the movement. Therefore, vertical links is vital to the success of collective resistance. Compared to the "right-defense" movements participated only by "weak" groups, because ordinary social movements involve many cross-class participants including some social elites who may have connections with high-ranking authorities, their organizers thus have more channels to construct and employ vertical links. Although many studies have discussed about the role of horizontal networks within and beyond the contest community, limited attention is paid to examining that of vertical links. This study not only examines the role of horizontal networks from more aspects, but also explores the significance of vertical links to ordinary social movements, which will help to cover the knowledge gap in social movement theories.

Except for personal vertical ties, the study also identifies the important role of two "public vertical networks" in collective resistance. On the one hand, from some successful cases of civil resistance[14], we can find that they experienced similar process of game to that of this movement: local power holders violated the interests and rights of ordinary citizens; the latter appealed to the mass media to voice their grievances; the media broadcast urged high-

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[14] Such as the very influential Incident of Jiahe Expropriation and Resettlement (e.g.see CCTV "social record": The Problem of Jiahe Resettlement (*Jiahe chaiqian zhi tong*)

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ranking authorities to punish the local power holders for their illicit actions. These cases suggest that the mass media may work as a vertical network that links ordinary citizens to the state. On the other hand, the appealing institution wielded by powerless citizens in ordinary social movement also works as another important "public vertical network" that bridges citizens and the state. Since the appealing institution is the main channel for powerless citizen to voice their grievances suffered from local power holders to high-ranking authorities, it becomes a potential resource of power for citizens to construct their resistance[15]. Those citizens who master the appealing "skills" and exploit the timing well can produce more power against local power holders. These two "public vertical networks" are linking social capital that bridge citizens and the state. By these vertical links, the state and citizens can cooperate to restrain local power holders from illicit actions.

This study also finds that trust is very important to ordinary social movements. There are three levels of trust that may contribute to the success of collective resistance. The first is the special trust on individual level. The movement history has displayed that the individual trust between protest leader and ordinary participants is indispensable for the former to lead collective action. The second level of trust is that between citizen groups with different class backgrounds. In GI, due to the initial successful collective resistance against the estate developer, residents with different class backgrounds interacted and cooperated more with each other. This in turn promoted the level of trust between different groups and thus community solidarity [16]. Furthermore, such trust between different groups and high community solidarity enabled movement elites to launch collective resistance against the more powerful local government. The third level of trust is the institutionalized one. The other two levels of trust come from personal experiences while the institutionalized one is based on stable social institutions (Luhmann,1979). Specifically, in contemporary China, the institutionalized trust comes from citizens' faith on law and central authorities (e.g. Ying,

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[15] According to Yu Jianrong, 88.5% citizens who conduct the appealing action are to "impose pressure on local authorities to get problems resolved" (Yu, 2004b). Actually, due to the pressure from appealing institutions, local government agencies often recede when complained of.

[16] As many GI movement activists pointed out, due to many times of cooperation in the movement, participants in different social status are comfortable with each other.

2001; Li, 2004). In Shanghai, on the one hand, many citizens are dissatisfied with local authorities due to a lot of specific problems. On the other hand, most of them trust high-ranking governments because of economic and social development[17]. This institutionalized trust also contributes to collective action. In this movement, protest elites believed that, only if they follow law to act, they would not risk a lot and might get support from mass media and the state. That is one important reason that they dared to launch collective resistance against the powerful local government. Therefore, in many ways, trust contributes to the mobilization of ordinary social movements.

In conclusion, horizontal networks are helpful in mobilizing leaders and participants into collective action; vertical links facilitate citizens to voice their grievances and to request for support from high-ranking authorities; trust "lubricates" the collective action. Therefore, social capital plays important role in all "junctures" of ordinary social movements. In other words, only by wielding social capital, citizen protestors can organize collective resistance and get support from the state. The "stock" and nature of social capital greatly influence the emergence and subsequences of ordinary social movements[18].

In contemporary China, social capital is not only helpful for citizens to facilitate their collective resistance and for civil spaces to grow up, but also able to promote the legitimacy and autonomy of the state. Due to the "split" administrative system, the state cannot superintend local governments efficiently. One of the consequences will be that local governments may engage in lawless interest-oriented activities at will, which is reflected in a number of reported cases of collective corruption. This will be harmful to the legitimacy and autonomy of the state. Therefore, by the linking social capital, the state may utilize citizens to watch on such activities. This will facilitate the state to impose constraints on local

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[17] Many local residents told me some words like this: "there are problems here and there. However, in general, the country has been developing and the society has been making progress. There are hopes!"
[18] it need to noted here that social capital can be employed by citizen protestors to facilitate their legal collective resistance, but may also be utilized by local power holders to disintegrate and collapse the movement. This can be illustrated by this case that the local government also utilized the link between them and the civil associations of residents' committees to disintegrate the movement.

governments and thus strengthen its legitimacy and autonomy.

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Appendix: the map of North Green Neighborhood

The Map of North Green Neighborhood

GII Neighborhood

The Community Park

GI Neighborhood

High residential buildings