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Abstract

As often argued, a negative perception of immigration, or even emigration, prevails public opinions and governments in most countries. It is argued that caused by economic hardship or political hardship or political unrest in countries of origin, it would threaten well-being and identity in countries of destination, and sometimes endanger political security. However, on the other hand, social scientists recognize that, being a part of the global circulation and global integration, human mobility bears a tremendous potential for human progress. This view is increasingly shared by several actors for which adequate policies could make migration a genuine instrument for economic and social development. Therefore, the conditions under which, and the mechanisms through which, migration can transform individual benefits into an aggregated one, for the greater society, are to be studied. From this perspective, Turkey provides us with an interesting case study; firstly because of its multiple migration roles as a country of emigration, immigration and transit, over time; secondly because, this ongoing flows of emigration and immigration involve various stages of a migration cycle; thirdly because, this migration cycle reflects, both explicitly and implicitly, some gains, and occasionally loses, both for the country and its people, migrants and non-migrants; and finally because of Turkey's long-established EU-membership process which highlights various types of migration issues. This report provides us with an overview of some aspects of migration-development nexus in the case of Turkey.

Keywords: Development, emigration, immigration, remittances, migration cycle, Turkey, European Union.

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INTRODUCTION

It is common to perceive international migration as a “problem”, a “negative issue” or a “complexity” that necessitates a struggle to be fought against at the public opinion and the governmental levels of most countries (Fargues et al. 2004). Yet, despite the concept’s negative connotation, there are certain and undeniable values that the phenomenon contributes both to the sending and receiving countries. Social scientists recognize that, being a part of the global circulation and global integration, human mobility bears a tremendous potential for human progress (Castles & Wise 2008, Castles & Miller 1997, Massey 1988). More specifically, international migration has increasingly been treated by the academia and even by the international organizations as a genuine instrument for economic and social development. Therefore, the conditions under which, and the mechanisms through which, international migration can transform individual benefits into an aggregated one for the greater society are to be studied.

There has been a transformation within the studies on migration from those conventional studies that focus on the impact of international migration on development via country-based or societal level analyses to those more recent ones that pay attention to individual level of analyses, referring to, for instance, the notion of “human development” (Castles & Wise 2008, de Haas 2003). Human development refers to economic, social, political, and cultural changes that enlarge people’s choices and their life chances (for a detailed study see Fukuda-Parr & Kumar 2004). From this perspective, Turkey, as a country of emigration as well as of immigration and transit migration, provides us with an interesting case study to illustrate the linkage between human development and migration predominantly because of its high rate of international migration movements over time.

This essay traces the impacts of international migration on various indicators of human development in Turkey from the guest worker programmes of the mid-20th century to the most recent EU-centric migratory regimes of the early 21st century. The ongoing interaction between international migration and human development are analyzed against the background of changing patterns of migration and the transformation of Turkey from a country of emigration to a country of transit migration as well as a country of immigration. The migration-induced changes taking place in Turkey today are transforming the country's economy and society profoundly. A main question to be analyzed here is how much and what

types of economic, social, political, and cultural opportunities are provided to the individual citizens in Turkey through emigration and immigration flows in the country.

After summarizing the history of emigration, immigration, and transit migration flows in Turkey, this essay will elaborate the economic consequences of these flows for the human development in the country. The *second* analytical part of the essay will focus on the social, political, and cultural consequences of international migration for the human development in Turkey. In the *third* analytical part, there will be a discussion on how the question of international migration is debated in the context of Turkey's EU membership affairs, which also partly comes to the fore as an issue of human development question. *Finally*, this essay concludes that for the last five decades international migration has been one of the most powerful vehicles of human development in Turkey.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TURKEY: A COUNTRY OF EMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION AND TRANSIT

Turkey currently occupies a prime place in international migratory regimes in the Eastern Mediterranean basin and is at the confluence of two migratory systems of great influence: the major reception zone of Europe and the emerging source regions of emigrants of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The geostrategic location of Turkey partly explains the country's status as a sending country *vis-à-vis* Europe and receiving/transit country *vis-à-vis* the neighboring regions. The same spatial coordinates that connect the country to the transnational spaces in its near geographies also construe the basic tenet of Turkey's character in the international migratory regime (İçduygu & Kirişçi 2009).

The prominent view in attempts to explain the dynamics of international migration is, without a doubt, based on the fact that people migrate in pursuit of higher incomes and a better quality of life, from less developed countries (regions) to developed countries (regions), parallel with the difference of development between national economies. Political turmoil and wars are further factors that accelerate such movements. A country's demographic structure and relevant processes, to the extent that they relate particularly to the labor market, are also added to the equation as important variables in the context of emergence and continuation of international migration. When approached from this perspective, a general assessment based on comparing countries in terms of their economic, social, demographic, political and cultural

attributes shall provide us with a starting point that gives a clue as to the potential migratory movements between these countries. Such a comparison would also serve to help foresee the “push” factors in the source country and “pull” factors in the receiving countries, revealing the migration potential. For instance, in 1969 when the Turkish labor migration to western Europe was in its initial period, GDP per head was USD 398 in Turkey, while it was USD 1,933 in Italy and USD 2,520 in Germany.¹ Today, while Turkey is still a source country of emigration to Germany, GDP based purchasing standard in Germany is 108, whereas this figure in Turkey is 28.5. Similarly, as Turkey has transformed into a country of immigration, the development gap between Turkey and the countries of origin of those migrants arriving in Turkey is also very remarkable. To illustrate, based on the figures provided by the UNDP's Human Development Report for the years 2007/2008, while GDP per capita was USD 8,407 in Turkey, it was USD 2,100 in Moldova and USD 2,307 in Pakistan.

Although sharp economic differences are often perceived to be satisfactory theoretical explanations for migratory movements, one should be well aware that basic determinants of actual migratory processes are much more complex. Different countries having different economic, social and demographic indicators in the sense referred to here does not necessarily mean that migratory waves have emerged between these countries only because of these factors. These differences might have caused migratory waves between Turkey and other countries only with contribution from much more complex economic, political, social and demographic processes.

Turkey as a Country of Emigration: 1960 Onwards

Turkey is among the world's leading migrant-sending countries, with about six per cent of its population abroad. Turkey was not a sending country up until the 1960s though there had been the mass emigration of the non-Muslim populations due to the nation-building process within the country in the early years of its foundation which was in 1923².

The country's Muslims' emigration, however, awaited the 1960s and operated in the specific form of a contractual labor export. After the making of the 1961 constitution, the First Five-year Development Plan (1962-1967) in Turkey delineated the “export of surplus labor power”

¹ These figures cited here were compiled from various reports of the United Nations.

² For the use of population movements within nation building processes, see Zolberg (1983) and Marcus (1985).

as an ingredient of development strategy concerning the prospective flows of remittances and reduction in unemployment. To promote this policy, Turkey first signed a bilateral labor recruitment agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961. Similar bilateral agreements, specifying the general conditions of recruitment, employment and wages, were signed with other governments (in 1964 with Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium, in 1965 with France, and in 1967 with Sweden and Australia). Less comprehensive agreements were signed with the United Kingdom in 1961, with Switzerland in 1971, with Denmark in 1973 and with Norway in 1981 (Franz 1994). By 1970, Turkey became one of the largest suppliers of workers in various labor importing countries (Paine 1974, İçduygu 1991). These agreements shaped the initial stages of migratory flows to a wide extent, but starting with the early 1970s migratory flows from Turkey gained their own dynamics and mechanisms, which were quite independent from the previously structured measures of the bilateral migration agreements.

The emigration starting in the 1960s were predominantly of economic nature influenced by macro-economic factors both at the global and national levels. The movement of migrant workers over the period of 1961-1975, which was a period of mass emigration when more than 100,000 workers left Turkey annually up until the stagnation of 1974, fluctuated as a consequence of changes in the European migration market (see Table 1). The number of workers going to Europe increased immediately after 1961, and peaked at 66,000 departures in 1964. In the later periods, the recession of 1966-67 caused a rapid decline in these numbers. In 1967, only 9,000 workers were sent by the Turkish Employment Service (TES), while over 900,000 were on the waiting list to go abroad (İçduygu 1991). When recession was over, the number of emigrants increased sharply the following year. The consequent economic stagnation in 1974 in almost every Western European country resulted in a dramatic decline of the number of labor emigrants, making a total of only 17,000 departures in that year. The year 1975 marks the end of large-scale Turkish labor migration to Europe. According to the official records in Turkey, a total of nearly 800,000 workers went to Europe through the TES between 1961 and 1974 (İçduygu 1991, Akgündüz 2008). 649,000 of these immigrants settled in West Germany, 56,000 in France, 37,000 in Austria and 25,000 in the Netherlands (İçduygu 2006a: 63). As evidenced by these figures, the biggest movement occurred to West Germany and France.

When agreements were terminated in the 1970s, emigration slowed down and took other

forms such as family reunion, refugee movement, and irregular labor migration (Böcker 1995, İçduygu 1996a). The Turkish government pressured by the growing unemployment statistics searched for new job markets, i.e., new countries of destination, for its unemployed masses in the late 1960s. Indeed, the Turkish emigration to Australia and to the countries of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) started as a result of this policy (see Table 1). In the period of 1968-1974, more than 5,000 Turkish workers arrived in Australia (see Table 1). Overall, there were nearly 12,000 Turkish workers and their dependents that arrived in the country between 1967 and 1975. Since 1975, the level of emigration to Australia has shifted from 200 to 500 settlers, who migrate via family reunifications and marriages, annually (İçduygu 1991).

In the 1980s, Turkey maintained a high level of male labor migration to the MENA countries, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iraq, as Turkey's search for new labor receiving countries corresponded with the demand for labor force in these countries (İçduygu & Sirkeci 1998).³ As stated by Appleyard (1995), the dramatic upsurge of oil prices after 1973, and the accompanying increase in the income levels of the oil-exporting MENA states with very small populations, boosted demand for labor. The result was a large influx of contract workers from the developing countries. Migration from Turkey to the MENA countries occurred within this broader context. More than 75,000 workers had gone to the oil-exporting countries in the period of 1975-1980. The total number of migrant workers who had an experience of selling their labor power in the MENA countries was over 700,000 from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s (see Table 1). However, by the mid-1990s, partly due to the completion of large scale infrastructural projects in the oil-exporting countries, and partly due to the increasing costs of Turkish labor in comparison with the costs of other labor migration coming from Asia (India, Bangladesh, Philippines, etc.), the number of Turkish workers in the MENA countries began to decline. Indeed, it fell by more than 100,000 from a figure of 250,000 in the late 1980s to 140,000 in the early 1990s and to 120,000 in the late 1990s. In the early 2000s, the number of Turkish workers in the MENA countries was less than 100,000.

With the collapse of the communist regimes in the 1990s, Turkish emigration continued with the flows of workers to the CIS countries yet within relatively small numbers (see Table 1).

³ The labor movement to the Middle East and North Africa was very much different from the migratory movements to Western European countries. It was always exclusively a temporary movement of male workers. Their duration of stay was determined by the completion period of the work, where these workers were usually employed for a period of two years. The return rate of these workers was very high, because only a small proportion of them could be hired by the same firm for a new project.

As emphasized by Gökdere (1994), after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, some of the newly emerging states in the region launched reconstruction programs. The active involvement of various Turkish firms in these programs attracted a crucial level of project-tied and job-specific migration. The importance of the emigration to the CIS countries was overwhelmingly clear in terms of its impact on the continuity of emigration from Turkey: in a period, when a downturn of migratory flows to the labor-receiving MENA countries occurred following the Gulf Crisis in 1990, the migratory movement to the CIS countries came as a remedy for the emigration pressure in Turkey. The level of Turkish labor migration to these states started to increase steadily: from 8,000 workers in 1992 to over 20,000 in 1993, and later to over 40,000 in 1994. It declined to 26,000 in 1996. In 2005, there were more than 70,000 Turkish workers employed in the CIS countries. Overall, in the period of 1990-2005 there were over 150,000 workers who left Turkey to work in the CIS countries.

Despite new and alternative destination routes, Europe remained a long-standing receiving area for an increasing number of newcomers from Turkey mostly due to family reunions in the 1980s and 1990s. Apart from the continuing family reunification flows, many of the immigrants arrived in the receiving countries via marriages that took place between those immigrants already living in Europe who would often choose a spouse from Turkey: marriage migration became a new form of family reunification. After the 1980s, the number of these marriage migrants increased due to emerging transnational networks. Meanwhile, the number of second and third generation migrants reached significant levels. The number of people in Europe from Turkey increased continuously from 600,000 in 1972 to almost 2,000,000 in the early 1980s and to 2,900,000 in the mid-1990s. In the mid 2000s, the total number was over 2,500,000.

Asylum-seeking was also another important dynamic of the migration flow to Europe. Especially in the last two decades, more than two-fifths of the people moving from Turkey to Europe which makes up nearly 700,000 were those who went with the claim of seeking asylum (see Table 2). There were around 400,000 asylum seekers coming from Turkey to Western Europe in the period of 1980-1995. In parallel to Turkey's poor record of human rights, the annual average number of Turkish citizens, who were officially registered as asylum seekers in the Western European countries increased from about 15,000 in the early 1980s to nearly 45,000 in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Table 2). Despite a considerable decline, the number of asylum seekers from Turkey revolved around high levels,

with an annual figure of 25,000 in the late 1990s.

All in all, the population size of the Turkish communities in Europe grew over time. One can identify three main reasons behind this phenomenon. *First*, Turkish workers were staying for longer periods than originally planned, and were bringing in their spouses and children. *Secondly*, as experienced since the early 1980s, there was an increasing flow of asylum seekers from Turkey. *Thirdly*, as more spouses were reunited, the birth rate of the Turkish population rose and large numbers of Turkish children were born in Europe. In fact, while the actual number of Turkish workers in Europe showed a relatively small increase in the period of 1985-1995, there was a considerable increase in the number of their dependents.

As an outcome of the five decade history of Turkish emigration, today there are several sizeable Turkish diaspora communities mostly in several European countries. Given the fact that in our globalized world, diaspora communities have increasingly become more and more connected to the origin country through the transnational networks, the crucial question is this: how do the diaspora communities impact on human development in the country of origin? Beyond those Turkish emigrants who return home and those remittances which were sent by these emigrants, a variety of influences of Turkish diaspora communities on various aspects of economic, social, and political spheres in Turkey was obvious: these influences range from the emerging ethnic business ties between Turkey and the host countries through various industries such as food and clothing to the increasing massive tourism between Turkey and the receiving countries, from the emergence of new TV channels broadcasting to the European countries to the establishment of several diaspora-based music and dance studios, rock and hip-hop mobiles, music schools, graffiti workshops, libraries, and alternative cafés and clubs in some big cities in Turkey, from the formation of diaspora-related civil society activities to the creation of academic institutions working on issues related to Turkish diasporas.

Turkey as a Country of Immigration and Transit: 1980 Onwards

Although Turkey's noted distinct position in the international migration regimes that include Turkey is a "country of emigration," based on the number of workers in West European countries, intense migratory movements headed towards the country in recent years has transformed Turkey also to a "country of immigration and transit" (İçduygu 2003, 2006b). In fact, migratory waves towards Turkey are not a new phenomenon as immigration flows into

the country existed since the early years of the Republic. International migratory movements towards Turkey during the process of nation-state building comprised mostly migrants of Turkish ethnicity, living in neighboring countries. Turkey attracted ethnic Turks of Hanefi-Sunni sect from the Balkans and the Caucasia, which contributed to Turkey's religious homogenization. However, especially since the 1980s, migratory practices of the early years of the Republic have followed a course that is substantially different from the migratory practices of recent times both in terms of nature and scale.

Turkey has received flows of migrant groups (transit migrants, irregular workers, professionals, retirees, asylum seekers and refugees) from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds migrating for various purposes, turning Turkey into a country of destination as well as transit. These migratory movements towards Turkey are closely related to Turkey's geographical location. Economic, political and security problems arising in neighboring countries are among the main reasons that drive their citizens to migrate to Turkey. Due to Turkey's position as a bridge between Asia, Europe and Africa, and its important sea routes, many migrants use Turkey as a transit country for migrating to their destinations in the developed countries of the West. The recent immigration into Turkey can be examined under two categories: (1) "regular", i.e., those migratory movements that take place "legally", and (2) "irregular" migration, referring to "illegal" or "unregistered" migratory movements. Irregular migration consists of transit migration of people from the Middle East, Asia and Africa, and irregular labor migration of people from the CIS countries. Regular migration, which is registered, covers those of professionals and retirees from the West.

Regarding *irregular migration*, one might note that the figures have substantially accelerated from the mid 1990's to the late 2000's. Although some senior officials⁴ claim the presence of around 'one million illegal foreign workers' in Turkey, there is no direct and reliable data on undocumented immigration. However some indicative numbers are available. The Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior reports that there were nearly 95,000 reported cases of irregular migration in 2000. Data on the numbers of irregular migrants who have been apprehended indicate a considerable decline in these numbers from 2000 to 2005. Whereas 19,000 irregular migrants

⁴ For instance, Yasar Okuyan, the Minister of Labour in the 1999–2002 government often cited the figure of 'one million illegal migrants' living in Turkey. Later same figure have been mentioned by so many authorities in the country.

were detained in 1996, this figure reached 47,500 in 1999, and by 2000 it became 94,600 (see Table 3). Starting from 2001, a decrease is observed in the number of irregular migrants detained: this figure, which was 83,000 in 2002, dropped below 50,000 in the year 2005. In 2006, there was a slight increase in the numbers of irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey, rising to nearly 52,000 in 2006. A total of 64,290 irregular migrants were apprehended in 2007, indicating an upward trend in irregular flows to Turkey since 2003. When it is considered that these figures represent only detained irregular migrants, it is clear that the scale of irregular migration through Turkey is greater than these figures. In reference to the relevant literature, it should be fair to say that the true picture would be at least two or three times the number of migrants detained. When the magnitude of such a figure is taken into consideration, it can be stated that the scale of the irregular migratory wave Turkey has received in recent years is comparable to many other countries of the world, which receive intense migration.

When the countries from which irregular migrants originate are considered, it can be seen that almost all of the migrants that come from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Bangladesh and some African countries choose Turkey as a bridge to reach their destination countries in the West. Considering the data available on migrants detained by security forces, it can be assumed that in the beginning of the 2000s, more than 50,000 migrants used Turkey as a transit country annually, while this figure has dropped below 25,000 today. Most of these transit migrants enter Turkey illegally with the help of human smugglers, and leave or attempt to leave Turkey using similar ways (İçduygu 2008).

Without a doubt, the political irregularities, problems and turmoil in the periphery makes Turkey's borders more open to asylum seekers. A great majority of these asylum seekers comprise migrants of Asian and African origin. Between the years 1997 and 2005, Turkey received approximately 24,000 asylum applications (see Table 4). When we consider their families as well, this figure climbs up to over 44,000. The greatest number of asylum applications to Turkey is received from Iran and Iraq. 46 per cent of these applications are those filed by Iranians, and 44 per cent by Iraqis. In 2000, 3,926 Iranians and 1,671 Iraqis sought asylum in Turkey (İçduygu & Toktaş 2005). In recent years, however, a decrease is observed in the number of asylum applications to Turkey. Whereas the approximate annual number of asylum seekers towards the end of the 1990s was 6,000, by mid 2000s, this figure

dropped to below 4,000. The migratory movements of asylum seekers, refugees, and transit irregular migrants sometimes intermingle. This is particularly related to the fact that the majority of persons in both groups enter the country illegally. Asylum seekers, after being denied asylum, continuing to stay or working illegally in Turkey or attempting to transit to a third country through illegal border crossings, rather than returning to their countries, are examples of intermingling of irregular migration and asylum seeker movements.

Based on its ongoing geographical limitation in the 1951 Geneva Convention Turkey still does not accept non-European refugees on *de jure* basis, but it is a *de facto* situation that the country receives numerous asylum seekers from neighboring non-European countries. The fact that Turkey does not accept non-Europeans as asylum seekers and refugees has several implications for irregular migration (İçduygu 2003; Kirişçi 2002). Most asylum seekers and illegal transit migrants, mainly from Iran and Iraq, make illegal border-crossings to Turkey with the help of smugglers and traffickers. Some irregular migrants apply for asylum although they have no grounds to do so. By limiting the application of the Geneva Convention 1951 to certain geographical areas, Turkey hopes to be immune to the flows of politically or economically deprived people coming from poor and unstable countries in Asia and Africa. In reality, however, the opposite seems to be the case: the country has been faced with increasing flows of people from these regions, including the Middle East. Turkish authorities have long feared that the abolishment of the geographical limitation would bring even greater numbers of asylum seekers to Turkey, or increase the numbers of foreigners settling in the country, which would have repercussions for Turkey's definition of national identity and even national security (Kirişçi 2005: 355-7).

Apart from asylum seeking and refugee movements directed at Turkey, the country serves as a destination to migrants coming from countries like Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Romania that are mostly employed on a temporary basis in areas like housekeeping, prostitution and entertainment, textiles, construction and tourism. These migratory movements take place, in a sense, in the form of circular migration or shuttle migration with multiple trips back and forth by the same person. A great majority of migrants enter Turkey legitimately, but after the expiration of their visas, they continue to stay and become unregistered migrants. Although the rate of irregular migrant workers in this category within the total number of irregular migrants seems to have increased in recent years, in fact, their numbers are decreasing. In the early 2000s, the annual number of such migrants is estimated

to have reached 50,000, a figure that has presumably dropped below an annual level of 25,000 today.

It is possible to explain the change in numbers of both transit migrants and aliens laboring in Turkey in the context of shuttle migration with several reasons. The relevant authorities in Turkey have implemented solid measures for regulating irregular migration in the context of procedures for harmonizing with the EU legislation, the penalties for human trafficking and smuggling have been increased and the issue of protecting borders is now dealt with more seriously. The EU process introduced a new perception and new law management of immigration and asylum flow in Turkey. It seems clear that in the last five years the idea of European integration has already made a significant impact on Turkey's policies and practices. Accordingly, Turkey has demonstrated strong political will to tackle asylum, irregular migration, and human trafficking and smuggling, as well as their labor consequences. In fact, all these changes had direct implications for the human development aspects of the international migration. There were *four* legislative developments that constituted direct steps toward harmonization with international standards, and particularly with the EU legislation and implementations (İçduygu 2004, pp. 93-4).

The *first* development was to fulfill the provisions of the *UN Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime and its Additional Protocols*. A draft law on additional articles to the Penal Code and amendments to *the Law on Combating Benefits-Oriented Criminal Organizations* was prepared by the Ministry of Justice and adopted by the Parliament on 3 August 2002. Through this legal arrangement, the Law No. 4771 added Articles 201/a and 201/b to the *Turkish Penal Code* to follow Article 201⁵. These changes conform to the *Palermo Protocol against Trafficking in Persons*, which introduces a definition of trafficking in human beings into the Turkish legal system and criminalizes the act of trafficking as such. The law prescribes severe penalties for traffickers: five to ten years' imprisonment. A further provision was adopted by the Parliament on the same day to criminalize migrant smuggling, conforming to the *Palermo Protocol against Migrant Smuggling*. These two separate but related crimes have now been fully addressed by the Penal Code.

⁵ For a detailed elaboration of these new Articles, see İçduygu (2003, pp.77-8).

The second important legislative decision was related to the *UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its two Additional Protocols* including ‘The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking, Especially Women and Children’ and ‘The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air’. Turkey was among the initial signatories. This Convention and its additional protocols were approved by the Turkish Parliament on 31 January 2003 and put into force on 4 February 2003. Again this new legal arrangement was a significant step in developing tools to combat trafficking, smuggling, and irregular migration.

The approval of the draft *Law on Work Permits for Foreigners* (Law No. 4817, dated 27 February 2003) was the third remarkable change in legislation pertaining to irregular migration and its labor outcomes. Although the Law was published in the Official Gazette on 6 March 2003, it became effective six months after its publication (on 6 September 2003). The Turkish Parliament enacted the Law in order to concentrate the administration of permits in one authority thus enabling foreigners to work in Turkey more easily. The Law aims to ensure that the work permit process in Turkey meets international standards, in particular those of the EU. One important aspect of this Law is to prevent the illegal employment of foreigners by issuing fines. In addition, it allows foreign workers to practice all professions. According to the previous legal arrangement, foreigners were not able to engage in domestic work. This resulted in the exploitation of thousands of Moldavian women working in the domestic sector in Turkey. The new *Law on Work Permits for Foreigners* and its accompanying Regulations⁶ (the Regulation for the Application of *the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners*, number 25214 and dated 29 August 2003, and *the Regulation for the Employment of Foreign Nationals in Direct Foreign Investments*, number 25214 and dated 29 August 2003) are the instruments which regulate the employment of foreign nationals in Turkey. The procedure for acquiring a work permit has been simplified: work permits are given by a central authority, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (the Law, Article 3), and are linked to residence permits, which are administered by the Ministry of the Interior (the Law, Articles 5 and 12). Regulations for foreigners working without work permits are an important aspect of the new *Law on Work Permits for Foreigners*. It is required that ‘independently working foreigners are obliged to inform the Ministry of the situation within at most fifteen days, from the date they have started working and from the end of the work’

⁶ For the full text of this law and related regulations, see MLSS (2003).

(Article 18a), and that ‘*employers that employ foreigners are obliged to inform the Ministry within at most fifteen days from the end of the said date and from the date when the service contract was terminated for any reason, in the case that the foreign employee does not start working within thirty days from the date when the work permit was given,*’ (Article 18b). The Law includes penalties for foreigners who work without permits. For instance, an ‘independently working foreigner and the employer employing foreigners, who do not fulfill their obligation of notification according to Article 18 within due time, are fined with an administrative penalty of two hundred and fifty million liras, for each foreigner’ (Article 21). In addition to this, ‘the foreigner that works independently without a work permit is fined with an administrative penalty of five hundred million liras’ and ‘an administrative penalty of two billion five hundred million liras is administered to the employer or employer representative that employs a foreigner who does not have a work permit’ (Article 21). It is also required that an ‘administrative penalty of one billion liras (be) administered to the foreigner who works independently without having a work permit given in accordance with this Law’ (Article 21).

Finally, an amendment to Article 5 of the *Citizenship Law* (Law No. 403, dated 11 February 1964) which was made on 4 June 2003, had implications for fighting against irregular migration and protecting immigrants rights. Previously, foreigners (women) could acquire Turkish citizenship immediately by marrying a Turkish national. Under new legislation adopted by the Turkish Parliament, foreigners who are married to Turkish citizens will be able to become citizens of the Turkish Republic three years after their marriage. Citizenship is conditional on the continuity of the marriage over three years. Previously, under Turkish law, it was much harder for male foreigners to obtain Turkish citizenship through marriage. This has now been standardized. In addition, under the new law, children of mixed parents (one Turkish, one foreigner) are granted Turkish citizenship. The new legislation ‘foreseeing that married couples from different nationalities must live together for three years after their wedding to obtain Turkish citizenship’ was enacted to discourage arranged marriages. Under the previous legislation, many irregular women migrants obtained their residence and work permits via arranged marriages.

Regarding *regular migration*, specifically those of professionals and retirees from the West, in the past twenty years, an increasing number of foreign nationals arrive in Turkey for work or education. Officials from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security regulate these persons’ stay in Turkey in line with the relevant legal regulations.

Considering official data for the early 2000s, approximately 160,000 foreign nationals received residence permits in Turkey (Table 3). For instance, in 2001, the number of foreign nationals in Turkey with residence permits was approximately 160,000, of which 23,000 were staying in Turkey on basis of work permits; around 24,000 on student visas; and the rest (some of whom comprise family members of these working or studying persons) on residence permits but do not currently work or study. The data for 2005, however, indicates the number of foreign nationals with residence permits to be around 132,000; 22,000 of whom stay on basis of work permits, whereas 25,000 reside on student visas. The remaining 84,000 of residents are mainly comprised of two groups – family members, retired and unemployed persons.⁷ Thousands of EU citizens are arriving, settling and working in Turkey in the past ten years at an ever increasing rate, which is indicative that the vibrancy of Turkish economy has increased in a manner enabling it to attract foreign labor and migrants (Kaiser 2003, Kaiser & İçduygu 2005).

In recent times, another type of regular migratory waves that target Turkey in increasing levels is the “retirement migration”. Retirement migration generally demonstrates a circular characteristic, in other words migrants spend only an important portion of the year at the place of migration. In the context of this migratory wave, many tourist resorts, prominently Alanya and other districts and towns of Antalya, Bodrum, Marmaris and Didim and surrounding areas, host a substantial number of retired European migrants. Although reliable statistics are not forthcoming, studies so far and residence permit statistics indicate that only in Alanya around 6,000 European migrants reside, comprising mostly Germans. Although we still need more statistical data and academic research, the number of retired Europeans in all of Turkey may be estimated to have neared 20,000 (Unutulmaz 2006).

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC REFLECTIONS

In investigating the linkages between international migration and human development, three questions appear to be pivotal: *first*, what are the main consequences of emigration for development; *second*, how these manifest themselves; and *third*, what means they were brought about? These are not easily known. Most research on the consequences of

⁷ The Bureau for Foreigners, Borders and Asylum of the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior provides figures for ‘working’, ‘student’ and ‘staying for various reasons’.

international migration for human development has been addressed primarily by looking at the economic aspects, as it could be anticipated from both the unquestioned importance of these conditions and the relative ease with which they can be measured.

Emigration and Its Economic Consequences for Human Development

As discussed earlier, organized mass flows of emigrants from Turkey began with bilateral agreements. Accordingly, from 1961 to 1974, the recruitment of migrants was carried out by the Turkish Employment Service (TES), the official delegations of the receiving governments, and employer associations. According to this procedure, to be able to go abroad as a worker, an individual had to apply to a local TES office, which would prepare a waiting list, containing the names of candidates for foreign employment. The demands for migrant labor made by migrant-demanding countries to the TES were of two kinds: “Nominative call”, which was a request by an employer for a particular person by name. In this case, there was no need to be on the waiting list. Hence, the TES had no influence on the process except providing a tax-free worker’s passport. In the second kind, the “anonymous demand”, an employer or the government of the migrant-demanding country requested a category of workers to fill a particular employment vacancy. When the vacancy arose, the TES offered it to the relevant candidate on the waiting list (İçduygu 1991: 47).⁸

Neither in the early phase of Turkish emigration, which was mainly attached to the European labor immigration, nor in the later phases, in which labor flows were mostly to the countries of MENA and CIS regions, government emigration policies in Turkey did not go beyond the negotiations over the bilateral agreements with the governments of migrant-receiving countries. Apart from negotiating over some additional social security agreements with the migrant-receiving countries, and providing migrant workers with some special worker passport, the governments in Turkey did not play any role in any type of activities related to the pre-departure phases of emigration: no pre-departure training, no visa facilitation, and no other supports were provided by TES, who was the main and only government institution involved in the process (Akgündüz, 2008).

⁸ In the peak periods of emigration in 1960s and 1970s, there had been some rumors over the problems of corruptions in various TES offices as some applicants claimed that some managed to go abroad without going into the waiting list.

When the Turkish government promoted labor emigration as a tool of economic development in the early 1960s, the basic idea was to reduce the pressure of unemployment, to gain foreign currency through remittances, and to provide some direct or indirect development strategies for underdeveloped regions of the country. Related to the last point, the government gave priority and facilitated emigration of those emigrants who were from the relatively poor regions of the country; who were members of Village Development Cooperatives in these poor regions—they were encouraged to invest their savings from abroad to these cooperatives, the cases to be discussed later in this section; and who were from the regions of natural disasters (Abadan-Unat 2006: 140).

Referring to a study on the relationship between socioeconomic development and emigration in Turkey (Day & İçduygu 1997), it is possible to argue that there is a bell shaped relationship between the two: emigration increases as the regions get poorer, but when the level of socioeconomic development reaches a certain low level, emigration rates start decreasing as well. It is within this context that while some relatively poor cities of 1960s and 1970s such as Denizli, Afyon, and Yozgat in the relatively developed regions of the country have been the main source of emigrants from Turkey to Europe, some poorest cities in the relatively less developed eastern regions have never become significant departure areas of emigrants (Ayhan et al. 2000). Consequently, different regions of Turkey have been affected by emigration flows at different levels. Today, it is possible to argue that economies of many emigration regions in Turkey are better, stronger, or more efficient as a consequence of emigration: Denizli and Afyon are good examples of this process, while Yozgat seems to be benefiting less from emigration - mainly due to the poor infra-structural facilities in the latter one (Ayhan et al. 2000).

Since from the beginning, Turkish emigrants have appeared to keep in touch with family and friends in the homeland. Many of them have visited Turkey occasionally on holidays, to attend weddings, or in response to the sickness or death of a relative. They have sent remittances, bought homes and lands, and made investments. Some of them have returned for good. At the very least, one could expect this combination of massive emigration and the maintenance of a high level of contact with homeland to be an important factor of change in Turkey's economic and social life. Naturally, *return migration and remittances* were highly central to this change (Atalık & Beeley 1993: 167, Keleş 1985: 63, Martin 1991: 38). Based on a very rough estimate, one can assume that more than 1,500,000 immigrants (Turkish

workers plus their family members altogether) have returned home since the beginning of migratory flows in 1961.

There is lack of substantial and contemporary data on the Turkish citizens' return migration. Since emigration from Turkey had started mainly under the so-called guest worker or contract labor scheme, return migration was an inevitable consequence of the whole process. Return migration increased after the oil price shock of 1973, when many West European countries stopped recruiting migrant workers and began to encourage return migration. According to Gitmez (1983), some 190,000 returned between the years 1974 and 1977, and another 200,000 returned between 1978 and 1983. Another study indicates that about 1,000,000 Turkish emigrants returned home up in the period of 1960-1990 (Martin 1991).

With the 1980s, the patterns of migration and settlement of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe have changed from a temporary stay to an unintended settlement. Still, return migration has often been a dynamic element of the whole migration picture. It seems that in the early 1980s, the "Return Acts and Bonuses" of the host governments encouraged substantial return migration to Turkey (Ayhan et al. 2000). For instance, under certain conditions Turkish immigrants in Germany were granted up to 10,000 German Marks in the early 1980s if they accepted to return home with their families. There were some 310,000 returnees from Germany in the period of 1983-85, and some 10,000 returnees from the Netherlands in the period of 1985-86. However, in the late 1980s, the levels of return migration from Germany declined sharply to 37,000 and from the Netherlands to 3,000 persons annually. These figures suggest that there has been a steady number of return migrants over the last two decades, stabilized at around 20,000 in recent years (İçduygu 2005).

However, the return migration of 1990s and 2000s is quite different from the return migration of 1970s and 1980s. In fact, return today is mostly a movement of a floating population of emigrants between the host and home countries. Many Turkish emigrants who had previously settled in various European countries are returning to Turkey, but not all of them permanently. Many of the first generation migrants who migrated in the 1960s and 1970s and later got retired have started living six months in Turkey and six months in Europe. They prefer the health services and pension systems in Europe; often do not wish to give up their houses, and try to keep in contact with their relatives, who live both in Turkey and abroad. (İçduygu

2005).

One of the most obvious implications of return migration was on the Turkish labor market. Some of the return migrants directly become employment-seekers as they return with skills and work experience for which the labor market in Turkey has limited demand. There is a widespread conclusion in the literature that most returned Turkish workers buy a taxi or delivery truck, build rental housing, or set up a small business and become part of the service economy, which are investments with few employment multipliers. It is hard to determine where exactly the migrants settle after they return, but it is generally agreed that they often prefer urban centers and metropolitan areas rather than their rural home (Eraydın 1981: 245, Gitmez 1984: 116, Wilpert 1984: 107). One hypothesis is that this process contributes to rural-urban imbalances and regional disparities as funds transferred by the migrants are often invested in urban areas that are already developed to a certain extent.

Another fascinating issue is the incoming workers' remittances which serve the interests of the country's economy as well as the welfare of migrant households. As noted by Martin (1991: 33), Turkey, as a developing country, faces perennial shortages of foreign funds to pay for imported goods and services, and often needs external capital to support development projects. From this perspective, workers' remittances greatly contribute to the country's economy. Although it is argued that the amount of emigrant remittances Turkey has been receiving is somehow insignificant in comparison with the total saving potential of these migrants, the scale of remittances attributable to labor migration to Europe is large enough and has been the most important source of foreign exchange earnings (Kumcu 1989, Köksal & Liebig 2005). Since the onset of mass labor migration from Turkey in the early 1960s, remittances have become an important element of the Turkish economy, an important source of foreign exchange, and a major contribution to offsetting the country's trade deficits (see Table 5). Over USD 75 billion has been remitted in Turkey since the early 1960s, giving the average annual figure of USD 1.9 billion (İçduygu 2005). Workers' remittances increased from a modest USD 93 million in 1967 to a peak USD 1.4 billion in 1974 and then declined to USD 893 million in 1978. Turkey had a more or less consistent level of annual remittance receipts of around USD 1.5 - 2.0 billion between 1979 and 1988. In this period, almost a quarter of Turkey's annual total import bill was financed by the remittance receipts. In the 1980s, remittances on average helped cover some 50 per cent of the balance of trade deficits. In the 1990s, the corresponding figure was over 35 per cent.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the country had annual remittance receipts of about USD 3.0 billion which increased to USD 3.4 billion in 1995, and then peaked to over USD 5.0 billion in 1998. In the 1990s, remittances were equivalent to more than one third of the trade deficit. The percentage declined throughout the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Today in the late 2000s, it makes only around two per cent of the deficit. It seems that, as the Turkish economy becomes integrated into the world economy through liberalization, the relative size of remittances has begun to decline, but still pay for a large portion of the trade deficits: in 1999, remittances accounted for more than 43 per cent of the trade deficit and over 2 per cent of the GNP. In 2000, the contribution of remittances to the trade deficit was considerably less than in 1999, but its contribution to GNP was almost the same.

In 2001, there was a notable decline in remittances, which continued to fall in the early 2000s, indicating lowest levels of remittances to the country in the last 25 years. This was reflected by the proportions of the total trade deficit, exports, and GNP. The nature of this decline is not so clear, which is partly due to the raising tendency towards permanent settlements in the host countries, partly because of the increasing informal channels of remittances, and partly due to the changing calculations of remittances in the accounting of the national budget, particularly since 2003.⁹ According to the official statistics, a very sharp decline has been observed in the amount of remittances to Turkey in 2004, which was a more than 80 per cent decrease compared to 2000, indicating the figure of USD 804 million, the lowest figure seen since the early period of migration from Turkey.¹⁰

The flows of remittances are naturally sensitive to the changing characteristics of the three actors of migratory process, namely the sending-country, the receiving-country, and the migrants themselves. For instance, according to Neyaptı, Metin-Özcan and Aydaş (2004), black market premium, interest rate differential, inflation rate, growth, home and host country income levels, and periods of military administration in Turkey have significant effects on the flows. Among them, the negatively significant effects of the black market premium, inflation,

⁹ Personal communication with Serdar Sayan (Department of Economics, TOBB University, Ankara).

¹⁰ The accounting system used to place remittances under a different account heading but in 2003 the Ministry of Finance differentiated accounts that remittances were followed and applied a mathematically different calculation method. It is hard to estimate how much of the 80 per cent decrease in the amount of remittances is due to this calculation as there combination of reasons such as the informal channels of remittances which are hard to track.

and a dummy for periods of military administration point at the importance of sound exchange rate policies and economic and political stability in attracting remittance flows. In addition, both investment and consumption-smoothing motives are observed, although the former appears to be more prevalent after the 1980s.

The money coming from abroad often finds its way into the maintenance of the family left behind or is spent as an investment in property, or possibly as part of the migrant's attempt to set himself up in a trade or other new enterprise (Atalık & Beeley 1993: 170). According to Koç and Onan (2004), remittances have a positive impact on household welfare, as the households receiving remittance are found to be better off than non-remitting households. Although some argue that remittances are not mostly spent on "productive investments" that would contribute to long-term development, "productive use" of remittances may be served in a variety of other ways such as investment in human capital in the form of expenses on certain consumption items, education, and health (Taylor 1999, Glytsos 1996). Findings from a survey conducted in Turkey in the late 1990s indicate that 12 per cent of the households that receive some kind of remittances in Turkey spend about 80 per cent of the remitted money on improving their standard of living, i.e., for daily household expenses, buying household items, and house renovation (Ayhan et al. 2000). When return migrants choose to settle somewhere different than their point of origin in Turkey, much of the remitted money is spent on consumables for the new home. Thus, although remittances do not directly help to reduce imbalances between regions in the country, they clearly make specific improvements possible in the lives of migrant households (Keleş 1985: 74).

In order to channel remittance savings into employment-generating activities, Turkish authorities installed three unique development programs in the 1970s (Keleş 1985: 65, Martin 1991: 35). *First*, they supported the establishment of *Workers' Joint Stock Companies* that would invest in the less developed areas rather than the developed regions of the country.¹¹ These companies were open through the remittances and the contribution of non-migrant households in the migrant sending regions; and if it is required, the State was able to provide co-financing through a public bank, *Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası)*, maximum up to one

¹¹ The company establishment applications should be filed to Ministry of Trade and Industry or provincial trade offices which are scattered all over the Turkey and existing in every city. Investors should follow the following steps: (a) Submitting the notarized the articles of association, (b) Depositing 0.1% of the capital at Central Bank account (c) Filling the Company Establishment Form and Register with Ministry of Trade.

third of the total investment. Such investments would generate job opportunities to the returning migrants *and* serve as a tool for the economical use of their savings. Regarded as an efficient way of industrializing the regions of origin, more than 600 workers' companies had been created with varying degrees of capital and number of shareholders. The workers' companies were aiming at achieving a social goal of developing the backward regions, but their role in fostering development has been rather minimal. They were unable to get away from the economic considerations related to the productive operation of the enterprises and have run into various problems such as project identification, financial and technical planning and management, and inadequacy of communications.¹²

Secondly, Village Development Cooperatives were founded, mostly in the poor regions of the country, as a part of the official policy of reintegrating the migrants' and return migrants' savings into the local economies. These Cooperatives were not designed solely as a means of to reinvest migrants' remittances, but rather remittances were only one of the main sources of financing these Cooperatives. As many of them sought to secure jobs for their members rather than to realize productive investments in the villages through remittances, most of the cooperatives were really used as a vehicle to facilitate more migration. Despite their shortcomings, they still had a considerable impact over the development of various migrant-sending communities. As an indirect indicator of their impact, their number increased remarkably: from over 2,000 in 1971, to more than 4,500 in 1973, and nearly 6,000 in 1974. The number of their members was nearly one million in 1974 (Abadan-Unat 2006: 145). One of the main contributions of these cooperatives was the mechanization of agriculture from 1960s to 1970s. To illustrate, in Boğazlıyan, a town of Yozgat province that is the origin of many migrants to Europe, the number of agricultural machineries had increased from 300 in 1966 to 1,500 in 1975, mainly through the investments made by emigrants (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976: 232).

Thirdly, State Industry and Workers' Investment Bank was founded in 1975 to attract the savings of the migrants. The main reason behind the establishment of this Bank was not only to attract the remittances, but also to channel the flows of remittances to the establishment and development of various industries around Turkey. The bank advocated mixed enterprises organized by the state and private capital, including workers' remittances. However, this

¹² As noted by Abadan-Unat (1986), almost all of these worker companies failed, leaving only 80 (out of 600) with an employment of 11,000 in the early 1980s.

effort has been unsuccessful both in overall enterprises and in channeling the investment resources into less developed regions.¹³

Emigration has obviously helped to reduce unemployment pressures in Turkey, but its effect is not easy to quantify since both emigration and employment are difficult to measure precisely. Turkey's first Five-Year Plan in 1963 reported that "the export of excess, unskilled labor to Western Europe represents one of the possibilities for alleviating unemployment" (Abadan-Unat 1986: 330). It is generally agreed that since the early 1960s, around 10 per cent of the workforce in Turkey has been unemployed and another 15 per cent underemployed. Thus, reduction in unemployment and underemployment is of paramount importance. Meanwhile, several studies point out the potential growth-slowing effects of Turkish emigration because of the emigration of skilled workers (Pennix 1982: 793). While Turkey has a long history of emigration of a certain level of skilled labor, the nature of this movement has changed over time: as far as the early guest-worker movement was concerned, nearly one-third of emigrants were skilled workers such as masons, carpenters, and plumbers (Akgündüz 2008: 156). However, the proportion of skilled workers (such as workers in car industry and construction sector who had earned certain training or developed a certain expertise and developed know-how in the job s/he had been performing) declined dramatically in later periods. Moreover, particularly since 1980s, there is a growing trend of brain-drain from Turkey. Many university graduates has migrated to the traditional migrant receiving countries of the United States, Canada, and Australia (Akçapar 2009). This group of immigrants refer to young and talented people with high social capital who continue their education abroad and continue working in the same host country instead of returning to Turkey. Similarly, Turkey has also become a source country of mass student migration: while some of these students tend to return home after their graduation, many prefer to stay in the countries where they study. Akçapar's study (2009) indicates that more than half of the Turkish university students in the United States intend to stay abroad after their graduation. On the other hand, development of private universities in the country serves an interesting case of return of highly skilled Turkish emigrants: since mid-1980s, private universities in the country with their very competitive facilities have attracted many Turkish scholars, scientists, and university graduates living abroad, back to the country.

¹³ It is important to note that stock exchange became an investment option for Turkish migrant workers in Europe only after its establishment in 1980s.

Immigration and Its Economic Consequences for Human Development

As noted earlier, the new immigration flows to Turkey have been historically atypical for the country, consisting largely of transit migrants, irregular laborers, asylum seekers, and refugees who began to arrive first in small numbers, and subsequently in an ever rising tide that has reached sizable figures in recent decades. The nature of national immigration policies and practices in Turkey has been very much affected by the European Union's promotion of the notion of "migration management" in the process of European integration, transforming the qualities and conditions of migration and asylum policies and practices in the country.

It is within this context that, as noted earlier, the new *Law on the Work Permits of the Foreigners* and its accompanying Regulations indicate an important step in legislation pertaining to immigration and its labor outcomes. The Law can be regarded as an indicator of the official "unintended acceptance" of the fact that Turkey is on the way of becoming a country of immigration. It centralizes the administration of work permits in a single authority to ease the permit process for foreigners, matching international standards, particularly the EU ones. One important aspect of this Law is to prevent illegal employment of foreigners through issuing of fines. In addition, unlike the previous legal arrangement that banned foreigners to engage in certain employment sectors, the new law allows foreign workers to practice all professions. One such sector was domestic work, which had resulted in, for instance, exploitation of thousands of Moldavian women working in the domestic sector in the country.

Among different types of immigration flows to Turkey, circular type of irregular migration has the most direct economic implications. Circular, or shuttle, migration refers to the mobility of persons making multiple trips to Turkey in search of economic opportunities. In this type of irregular migration, entry into Turkey is typically legal, but these visitors may overstay their visas. An important type of shuttle migration is *suitcase trade*, which is also known as shuttle trade, trader tourism, or shopping tourism. This is a legal form of trade-based mobility and people carry goods in the luggage that they carry during transportation. *Suitcase trade* is an effort to take advantage of the demand for and supply of various merchandise and differences in their costs (including taxes, tariffs and transportation) between origin and destination countries. Suitcase trade to Turkey, particularly to Istanbul, from the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, and later Bulgaria) started in the late 1980s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

concomitant removal of travel restrictions, entries by suitcase traders from the Eastern European and CIS countries skyrocketed to more than one million per year and remained so throughout the 1990s.¹⁴

In recent decades, the suitcase trade has been a central component of the trade balance in Turkey. Revenue from the suitcase trade, particularly from the former communist countries in the neighboring regions, is highly significant compared to the total remittance income. For the period 1996–2003, the amount gained from the former was always higher than the amount gained from the latter (see Table 6). In 2005, the amount of revenues from suitcase trade was nearly USD 3.5 billion, four times higher than the revenues from remittances of the same year. In 2006, the amount of revenues from the suitcase trade was more than USD 6.4 billion, indicating nearly 85 per cent increase compared to the previous year, and six times higher than revenues from remittances of the same year. In 2007, suitcase trade was around USD 6.0 billion, five times more than the remittances of the same year. Turkey's long established flexible visa regime, which is particularly open to the citizens of country's close geographies, has been very helpful for the movement of the citizens of the Eastern European and CIS countries. However, as part of Turkey's recent policies of combating irregular migration, there have been some attempts of changing the visa regime towards a more restrictive one.

Another significant type of irregular circular migration is the mobility of people who come to Turkey in search of informal jobs. These *irregular labor migrants* are poorer people mostly from the CIS and some Eastern European countries who arrive in Turkey on tourist visas to work informally as domestic laborers, sex workers, construction workers, or sweatshop workers. The majority of them appear to be women, and hail from places such as Moldavia, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Transcaucasian Republics and Central Asia.¹⁵

The economic contribution of irregular circular migration to certain sectors of the economy in

¹⁴ Although exact figures are unavailable, suitcase trade exports from Turkey to FSU countries were estimated to be around 9 billion dollars in 1996 and fell sharply after the Russian financial crisis in 1998 and have not recovered from a low point of 2 billion dollars per year since the early 2000s, partly as a result of the transformation of the nature of international trade between Turkey and Russia and other FSU countries. For a detailed account of shuttle trade from the FSU, see Yenal (2000) and Yökseker (2003).

¹⁵ There are many commonalities between the mobility of suitcase traders and circular labor migrants: they are both largely informal, and this informality is transnational in character operating through cross-border social networks and linguistic and ethnic ties, often intermingled with each other. States on both sides seek to curb such population mobility through restrictive measures with the unwanted result of increases in corruption (Eder 2007). Also, both types of circular migration are characterized by the prevalence of women (Yökseker 2004, 2007).

Turkey is obvious: domestic care, construction, textile, entertainment, tourism, food, and restaurant sectors largely benefit from these migratory flows. These migrants are attracted to these sectors not only because they provide “cheap and skilled” labor that is needed, but also as it will be discussed later, they have a culture of good work, which is very much appreciated by the receiving communities and individual employers. Still, immigration movements to Turkey have been highly irregular in nature and maintaining a legal presence in Turkey for all migrants is very difficult due to limitations on residence and working permits or in the Turkish Citizenship Law. This status of irregularity often disadvantages migrant worker in the labor market, pushing them often to work in the 3-D jobs (difficult, dangerous, and dirty) with low payments (İçduygu & Akçapar 2006, İçduygu & Biehl 2008).

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL REFLECTIONS

The academic literature on the linkages between international migration and development is very much preoccupied by the economic aspects, largely overlooking the impact of international mobility on the social, political, and cultural spheres. This section will focus on these latter aspects and relate them both to emigration and immigration in Turkey as they are often directly associated with human development.

Emigration and Its Social, Political, and Cultural Implications for Human Development

International migration has a great potential to bring about a variety of social mobility to the migrants as well as to their relatives, friends and their communities at large. For instance, there is ample evidence that emigration has greatly affected the employment status of Turkish migrants in the receiving countries, and in Turkey upon their return. Women are particular examples: migration enabled many of them to participate in labor force for the first time in their lives, or took them from agricultural sector to manufacturing and service sectors. Such changes in emigrants' employment status increased their economic well-being, which raised their social status, removed their burden of debt, or opened up opportunities for schooling, training, or entrepreneurship (Day & İçduygu 1997).

The experience of emigration also affects the migrants' perceived social status. While in Europe, Turkish workers are generally accorded a very low social status, but their social

standing in Turkey improves markedly both in rural and urban communities. Returnees are usually among the wealthiest people in their villages of origin, or emigration facilitate return migrants to relocate in urban areas. Furthermore, as noted earlier, remittances are most often spent on building a modern house, buying land, and farm machinery, and purchasing urban apartments, cars and trucks, or electrical appliances (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976). Return migrants in villages with cars and appliances noted frequently that their non-migrant neighbors also made such purchases during the 1970s and 1980s, but they were often among the first with new consumer goods and usually had more of them. This suggests that in many ways, emigration provided the remittances and perhaps the desire for such purchases, and sped up changes that would have occurred in any event. Abadan-Unat (1986: 364) emphasizes the conspicuous consumption of returnees, noting that some displayed electrical appliances as a symbol of their affluence even before their village had received electricity. On the other hand, it appears that social and economic inequalities have been prone to the negative impact of emigration: some studies indicate that socio-economic status of non-migrant households worsens compared to their migrant counterparts' (Day & İçduygu 1997, 1998, 1999). While migrant households accumulate wealth through remittances, this change in migrant-sending communities causes the gap between the socio-economic status of these households and that of non-migrant households widen. The related price inflation of properties has also an enormous negative impact over these non-migrant households.

Turkish workers often return home with changed attitudes and behaviors: in fact, the label of “Almanyalı”, which literally implies “Turk from Germany” as the local non-migrant people call the Turkish migrants in Europe with this expression, is a product of these perceived changes in attitudes and behaviors (Atalık & Beeley 1993: 169). There are also changes in generational and gender relationships within migrants’ more immediate personal-social environment; perhaps the most important being the changing status of women (Abadan-Unat 1977: 35, Kadioğlu 1994: 533) and the rising value of children (Kağıtçıbaşı 1988: 11). Emigration affected women’s role through several ways: urbanization, the adoption of a nuclear family pattern, entry into the labor market, and increasing media exposure brought about changes in life styles and emancipation, particularly for many rural women who joined their husbands abroad and found jobs there. For thousands of women from Turkey, emigration has been a real cause behind their growing labor force participation. To illustrate, while the proportion of female Turkish workers in Germany's labor force was 26 per cent in 1974, this proportion for those females in Turkey employed outside agriculture was only 11 per cent in

1975 (Abadan-Unat 2006: 165).

According to Akgündüz (2008: 152), there are numerous evidence that some Turkish migrant women made deliberate efforts to join the mainstream social life in Europe: "...young female workers living in München developed a custom of getting together at weekends and going dancing". Given the fact that in 1960s, dance was still something alien for many women in Turkey, the modernizing effect of emigration is very obvious for the individuals and their families. Likewise, findings from a survey of Turkish migrants in Germany in the early 1960s also indicate the transformation to a European life style: 20 per cent of the respondents ate pig meat, 38 per cent saw observing Ramadan incompatible with modern life, and only 23 per cent fully fasted during Ramadan (Abadan-Unat 1964).

Upon their return to Turkey many migrant women have wanted to settle in urban areas, and they have often tended to acquire more authority within the family. For the men, traditional symbols of status that are based on age, kinship, devoutness, or ownership of land were replaced by modern indicators such as income, qualifications, skills, and perhaps knowledge of a Western European language. The roles and relationships of parents and children have also changed as a result of migration experience, which was perceived rather negatively by the parents, fathers in particular, as they began to lose their traditional authority over children. In short, emigration was one of the factors that pressurized the extended family and traditional familial relationships.

There are other rather unintended social consequences of emigration such as cultural-revivalist tendencies among the Turkish migrants abroad, problems related to return migration and second-generation returnees (Sayarı 1986: 95). The cultural-revivalist trends are associated with the growth of Muslim fundamentalism as well as the troubles with Kurdish nationalism. Many Turkish emigrants tend to adopt a discernibly more Islamic orientation and many Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin reinforce their ethnic allegiance. Two factors explain cultural-revivalism: the defense mechanisms of emigrants in a foreign environment, and the multiculturalism-related policies and practices of the host countries which encourage these religious and ethnic revivals (Abadan-Unat 1997: 247). It is also possible to see these developments as a part of identity politics, a vital socio-political element of the political culture of contemporary liberal democratic states. In this respect, international migration contributes to new identity formations at an individual level that may imply some gains to the

human capital of immigrants.

The reintegration of return migrants and their families in Turkey also is a complexity. For those who returned in the 1960s and 1970s, the return and integration question was not critical. They were engaged in temporary labor migration, many anticipated their eventual return to Turkey, and acted accordingly. Also, these early returned migrants were mainly single men who had emigrated alone. On the other hand, return migrants in the 1980s and 1990s were more likely to be families with adolescent children. Fearing that they might not be able to go back to Europe at a later time, many of them left a younger member of their family behind to retain their link with Europe. They could not decide whether to permanently settle in the host country or resettle in Turkey. Such indecisiveness together with the adjustment difficulties of their children who had already spent their early socialization period abroad, aggravated the reintegration process of these return migrants. The children of returnees had serious problems in adapting to the very different social and educational environment of Turkey. In order to overcome certain education-related problems of the children of returnees particularly from Germany, the Turkish government has set up some secondary schools where the medium of education was German.

Civic values such as respect for human rights and democracy tend to increase with the experience of emigration (Martin 1991: 61). As Turkey grants, and even promotes, dual citizenship, many Turkish citizens enjoy the citizenship rights in their host countries (İçduygu 1996b: 252) (see Table 7). Between 1991 and 2002, almost 800,000 Turkish nationals, indicating more than one-fifth of Turkish emigrants, have become naturalized citizens of their host countries. Besides citizenship, military service is another civic value in Turkey that is changing due to emigration: since 1908, military duty had been nearly two years, but it has been shortened for Turkish males residing abroad in a special program, which was a consequence of emigration. Accordingly, by paying a fee in foreign currency, Turkish males only conduct it for three weeks.

Other social consequences of emigration can be observed in the areas of demography and urbanization. Since the early 1960s, emigration from Turkey has almost invariably exceeded immigration causing a slower population growth than that would happen otherwise. Meanwhile, emigration also caused a slowdown effect on internal migration from rural to urban areas, mainly from east-to-west. In the 1960s, those early internal migrants who had

migrated from east to west, or from rural to urban areas in the 1950s, tended to emigrate from Turkey to Europe: this was a type of step-by-step migration, moving internally first, and then internationally. In addition to these trends, there were also an increasing trend in which many from rural areas emigrated directly without going internally to more urban areas. In the 1970s, these flows together with the construction of a modern infrastructure in the country seemed to accelerate east-to-west and rural-to-urban migration. A survey indicates that more than one-third of the migrants who left Turkey for Australia had first migrated from their villages to the big cities in Turkey, and then went abroad (İçduygu 1991). Another survey shows that while return migrants were not coming back to their hometowns or villages, but rather settling down in urban areas and in the relatively more developed western regions of the country; their relatives and friends were also tending to follow similar patterns of internal migration to urban areas and western regions. All in all, emigration holds out the possibility of encountering a variety of social-transformation-producing forces (Day & İçduygu 1997).

Immigration and Its Social, Political, and Cultural Implications for Human Development

As noted earlier, a vast majority of immigrants in Turkey is irregular migrants who often suffer considerably because of their illegal status. Without a legal standing, the few rights that are guaranteed to all migrants and refugees, such as right to education, public medical assistance, or social assistance by the Social Assistance and Solidarity Funds are inaccessible. Thus, immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in Turkey are often confronted with various hardships in terms of their social, political, and cultural integration into the receiving society. The rather slow but ongoing changes in government policies and practices over the issue of migrant integration is a direct reflection of this migratory picture.

Historically speaking, the immigration and asylum policies and practices in Turkey are very biased towards the inflows of persons of “Turkish descent and culture”. As noted earlier, since the early years of the Republic, Turkey has always been a country of immigration, but until the early 1980s this has been mainly limited to the arrivals of ethnic Turks as a part of the nation-building process. It was within this context that the *Law of Settlement* was adopted in 1934 (Law No. 2510, dated 14 June 1934), which limits formal immigration to Turkey to individuals and groups of “Turkish descent and culture”. The new Settlement Law of November 2006 continues with this approach, which is very closely related with the

traditional conception of “Turkishness” reminiscent of the 1930s. The identifying features of “Turkishness” are not solely related to Turkish ethnicity but the ability and willingness to adopt the Turkish language and become a member of a Sunni-Muslim ethnic group often closely associated with the past Ottoman rule. Technically, Albanians, Bosniacs, Circassians, Pomaks, Tatars, and Turks --- mostly from the Balkans --- who are included in this definition will be able to immigrate to Turkey. Minorities claiming a link to Turkey who are not Sunni Muslims, that is, everyone from Armenians and Assyrians to Greeks and Jews, as well as non-assimilated Kurds and Alevis, are likely to face difficulties in immigrating to Turkey.

Turkey's transformation over the course of the two decades into a land of immigration is one of the most significant features of its recent history and very much an issue of debate. This relatively new migration phenomenon has had a number of social, economic, and political implications, not only for the country as a whole, but also in the wider context of the society (İçduygu 2004, 2003; Kirişçi 2002). The flows of immigrants and asylum seekers with their diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds brought forward a number of social, political, and cultural implications for the human development in the country. *First*, although there is some evidence of implicit and explicit racism and xenophobia towards immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers,¹⁶ diversity of the population is definitely enhanced by these new migratory inflows. Obviously, diversity enriches the environment in which people live and work, and consequently, contributes to greater productivity and creativity. For instance, according to Turkish employers who prefer migrant foreign workers mainly in the sectors of domestic work, textile, construction, entertainment, and food production, “migrant workers are more tolerant, more disciplined, more educated, speak foreign languages and are more hard-working than their Turkish counterparts” (İçduygu & Akçapar 2006). They bring a new culture of work to Turkey, which is not only economically valued, but also socially and culturally appreciated. The case of migrant domestic workers is illustrative: they are often employed for child care, because foreign language speaking nannies can assist children to learn foreign languages, or for elderly care as they are more skilled, more tolerant, and more disciplined.

¹⁶ As noted in a recent study (İçduygu and Biehl, 2008), in the public perception in Turkey almost all female migrants from Eastern European countries were associated with prostitution, while most black migrants were associated with drugs and criminality. There is countless news in the Turkish media on frequent operations against prostitution gangs. On a disturbing editorial piece on African migrants and criminality, see for instance, *Aksam* (Turkish daily newspaper), “Turkiye’de siyahlar, fuhus ve uyusturucu” (Blacks in Turkey, prostitution and drugs), 12.06.2002.

Secondly, intermarriages between Turkish nationals and immigrants in Turkey and immigrant naturalizations are two phenomena that have an effect on the social, political, and cultural development of the society. Although no scholarly study exists on intermarriages, there is evidence that immigration to Turkey has led to emerging patterns of intermarriages mostly between Turkish men and immigrant women. Some of these mixed marriages are not direct products of immigration, but rather the cause of a marriage migration as many migrant women come to Turkey after they get married. In the absence of any reliable official data, it is impossible to give clear figures about the volume of these intermarriages. However, based on media coverage, only in the Mediterranean coastal tourist center, Antalya, there are a couple of thousand mixed marriages between Turkish citizens and immigrants. Majority of them are intermarriages between Turkish men and Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldavian women, and more than four thousand children belong to such mixed marriages (Today's Zaman 2007). Similar anecdotal evidence indicates that there are thousands of mixed marriages and children who are the fruits of such marriages in Istanbul, the biggest city in Turkey that serves as a hub for immigrants. The question of how newcomers mix with the natives and shape new identities along the way are very central issues of human capital in the country.

An implication of mixed marriages in Turkey is legal, and related to the naturalization policies and practices in the country, which came in the form of an amendment to Article 5 of the *Citizenship Law* (Law No. 403, dated 11 February 1964) made on 4 June 2003. The amendment had implications for fighting against irregular migration and protecting immigrants' rights: The main objective was to combat arranged marriages through which citizenship rights (residence and work permits) could easily be gained especially by irregular female migrants. Previously, female foreigners could acquire Turkish citizenship immediately by marrying a Turkish national. With the new legislation, citizenship became conditional on the continuity of the marriage over three years. Moreover, while it was much harder for male foreigners to obtain Turkish citizenship through marriage under the previous law, it has now been standardized for both genders. In addition, under the new law, children of mixed parents (one Turkish, one foreigner) are granted Turkish citizenship immediately.

For immigrants, naturalization often operates as a tool to access a better life. Thus, it does not only reflect a type of individual gain, but also represents a broader social return, and should be evaluated in the wider context of human development. Turkish citizenship can be acquired by birth, descent, or naturalization. Turkish citizenship is open to non-Turkish people who are

willing to assimilate culturally and linguistically to Turkish culture based on certain conditions regulated by Law No. 403/1964 on Turkish Citizenship.¹⁷ The law favors the *jus sanguinis* principle and offers facilitated access to citizenship to those immigrants who can prove that they are of “Turkish descent and culture”, which consist the vast majority of those people who were granted Turkish citizenship after birth. Most of these people entered the country based on the 1934 Law of Settlement mentioned earlier that also differentiates between those settled by the state (*assisted/settled immigrants*) and those who settle themselves (*free immigrants*). In the period between 1995 and 2006, 56,449 free immigrants acquired Turkish citizenship (see Table 8). While 43 per cent of these acquisitions were based on marriages with Turkish citizens, the remaining 57 per cent were acquisitions by naturalization. As to the previous nationality of the people who obtained Turkish citizenship, countries with the largest numbers were Bulgaria (23,634 or 42 per cent), Azerbaijan (3,876 or 7 per cent), Romania (2,894 or 5 per cent), the Russian Federation (2,193 or 4 per cent), Iraq (1,635 or 3 per cent), Iran (1,337 or 3 per cent), and Moldavia (1,292 or 2 per cent).¹⁸

Based on Turkey’s still kept geographical limitation on 1951 Convention, the current asylum- and refugee-related policies and practices in the country are also revealing indicators of the treatment of immigrants in Turkey. The specific cases asylum seekers With no regulations pertaining to the status of non-European asylum seekers, Turkey has applied its domestic laws to foreigners entering the country, meaning that incoming foreigners are expected to possess valid documents and can remain only within the permitted period of stay. As noted earlier, at the same time, on the basis of various *de facto* refugee cases, the Turkish authorities for reasons of pragmatism have granted non-European asylum seekers some form of protection (Kirişçi 1995). These non-European asylum seekers are considered to be under temporary protection and are expected to leave the country. If their asylum applications to the Turkish authorities and UNHCR are processed and accepted, they can resettle in a third country; if their cases are rejected, they must return to their homeland. According to the new *Law on the*

¹⁷ Those applying for naturalization have to be adults (eighteen years or older) and they have to prove that they: a) have been residing in Turkey for at least five years, b) have decided to settle in Turkey, c) have good moral conduct, d) have no threatening illness, f) speak sufficient Turkish, and g) have a job or income to support themselves and their dependents.

¹⁸ The reason for the high percentage of Bulgarian citizens acquiring Turkish citizenship is that there are many Muslim immigrants from Bulgaria living in Turkey who have migrated to in several migration waves dating even back to the early years of the Turkish Republic. Furthermore, in 1989 there occurred mass migration from Bulgaria to Turkey. The major bulk of these immigrants were those fleeing ethnic persecution by Bulgarian authorities against the Turkish-Muslim community in the country. Although most of these immigrants returned back to Bulgaria, there continued family reunions as well as marriages between the Muslim-Turkish community in Bulgaria and immigrants from Bulgaria in Turkey.

Work Permits of Foreigners, only those asylum seekers and refugees who have residence permits of at least six months may have access to legal employment opportunities under certain specific conditions. Concerning the asylum- and refugee-related policies and practices, there are two main issues which are hotly debated both in Turkey and in the context of Turkey's international relations: first, the question of if Turkey will lift the geographical limitation on 1951 Convention; and second, the issue of the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, and even of the irregular migrants as they are often intermingled with the asylum seekers and refugees. Although the Turkish government has often faced with the criticisms coming from both domestic and international actors, it appears that it is quite reluctant to lift this limitation before the full membership of EU with the argument that Turkey will be a buffer zone between the EU countries and the origin countries of asylum seekers, and will carry the burden of these movements rather than sharing them with the EU countries (Kirişci, 2002; 2005). On the other hand, in order to positively respond to the criticisms over the issues of the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, and even of the irregular migrants, there have been constructive steps taken by the national authorities in the country. In particular, in relation to the controversial use of detention in guest houses, which is often subject to debates over mistreatments there, there are some new projects conducted through the collaborations with the EU authorities, in which the construction of several guest houses is already started as well as various new administrative and legal arrangements have been planned for the coming years.¹⁹

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: A DEBATE ON TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP

“Gradual realization of the free flow of workers” from Turkey into the European Economic Community was considered as a significant and *positive* issue in the Ankara Agreement of 1963, signed two years after the initiation of the intense migratory movement from Turkey to Europe in 1961 (Çiçekli 1998: 66). However, 42 years after this Agreement, the Negotiating Framework of 3 October 2005 between Turkey and the EU, stated that long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements, or provisions of permanent protection might apply for the free movement of people when necessary, emphasizing the importance of the issue once again, this time in a *negative* context. Various reports by the European Commission on Turkey

¹⁹ See Turkish Ministry of Interior and UNHCR Turkey Office, *Asylum and Migration Legislation*, Baskent Matbaası, Ankara, 2005

have underlined that Turkey's accession will be different from the previous enlargements, frequently making references to the issues of international migration.

Turkey's significant position as a country of *emigration*, *immigration*, and *transit*, particularly within the EU-centric international migration and asylum regimes, and the intermingling of international migration issues with the EU's economic, social and political policies of integration make international migration a central issue in Turkey-EU relations (İçduygu 2006). The EU puts forward three concerns in relation to Turkey's accession with international migration: (a) with reference to the adjustment problems of the immigrants of Turkish origin in Europe, an intense migratory wave towards the EU in case of free movement will create serious economic, social, and political integration problems; (b) whether Turkey's demography, and the migration waves of Turkish origin as a consequence of this demography, will have a complementary role on the demographic shrinkage process (low fertility and intense aging population) in the EU; and (c) whether Turkey, as a "receiving country" and "migration transit zone" will be successful in producing and implementing policies in compliance with the EU-centric international migration and asylum regimes, and if so to what extent.

The main question really is whether any possible immigration from Turkey to Europe will have any negative impacts on the human capital in the continent and the axis of this concern is centered around socio-economic and demographic differences between Turkey and the EU. For instance, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, Turkey is apparently the poorest country in comparison to the EU member states: in 2005, the average value in terms of GDP-based Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) for the EU-25 was 100. While this value was 105.5 for Italy, 48.7 for Poland, and 30.5 for Bulgaria, it was only 28.5 for Turkey (İçduygu 2006). In terms of demographic differences, the fact that Turkey has a higher density of its population employed in agriculture, a predominantly younger population, higher rates of population growth, higher fertility rates, higher infant and child mortality rates, more under-population in urban areas, sharper differences between regions and between urban and rural areas than the EU member states also reinforces the concerns of negative implications of a possible Turkish membership on the human capital of the EU. There are two contradictory perspectives on the issue:

- *Discrepancy based on demographic differences:* Based on the profound differences in terms of specific demographic indicators, this perspective argues that there are serious differences in social, cultural, economic and political domains between Turkey and the EU member countries; and emphasizing this point, frequently fosters a negative stand in terms of Turkey's EU membership, alleging difficulties regarding Turkey's adjustment to the EU (Coleman 2004).

- *Complementariness based on demographic differences:* Based on the assumption that the EU will seriously require a young population for social and economic reasons due to its aging population and declining fertility rates, this perspective argues that Turkey as a member of the EU will provide significant contribution to the European Union. Arguing that Turkey's demographic structure is complementary to the demography of the EU, this view provides a positive perception of Turkey's EU membership (see Behar 2006, Muenz 2006).

However, the extent to which this demographic complementariness will be realized or not is also an issue of debate (Behar 2006, Fargues 2005). To illustrate, if no migration occurs between 2005 and 2025, the population of age under 40 will get smaller, while the age group between 40 and 65 will remain constant and the ratio of the 65+ age group to the entire population will increase in the EU-27 member states (İçduygu 2006). If Turkey's accession to the EU occurs today, the changes that will take place in the EU from this date to the year 2025 in percentages will be as follows: The size of the active young section (ages 20 to 40) will decline by 12 per cent; active middle aged section (ages 40 to 60) will increase by 6 per cent, and the elderly section (ages 65+) will increase by 37 per cent. In the light of the above comparison, Turkey's accession to the European Union with its young population, which is much more rapidly growing than the EU, might slowdown the decline of active young population within the entire EU population. However, it will obviously not totally resolve the issue of aging population in the EU. The number of immigrants that the labor force market in the EU might require cannot be met even if Turkey's entire population migrates there. Moreover, the size of the workforce in Turkey, which is 35 million today, will reach 47 million in the year 2025, and 51 million in 2050. In short, it is evident that the transformation of the population in Turkey in the following 20 to 45 years cannot meet the expectations of the population in Europe.

Furthermore, obviously, not everybody will migrate. In order to find an answer for the

question “Who will migrate?” the desire to migrate to the EU member states can be examined under *two* levels (Krieger & Maitre 2006): the level of *general intention* where the question whether a general desire to migrate to the EU member states exists has been examined; and the level *specific intention*, which is an effort to achieve more definite and detailed information on the desire to migrate. In the light of these two indicators, Turkey can be said to demonstrate an interesting case. While Turkey has the largest number of people with a general intention to migrate among thirteen countries (after the recent significant expansion, 10 member states of the EU, new members of Bulgaria and Romania, and candidate Turkey), Turkey also has the least number of people with a specific intention to migrate. At the same time, it seems that only 0.3 per cent of the Turkish population has a specific intention to migrate in the following five years. If asked, “how does this relatively contradictory situation translate into possible migration from Turkey following the realization of free movement?”, it is possible to say the following: Considering that in 2003, the potential for possible Turkish emigrants was 48.9 million, it can be estimated that the potential size of population with a general intention to migrate will be 3.03 million, and of those with a specific intention to migrate will be 150,000 (İçduygu 2006).

The search for answers to the question regarding the common characteristics of people with a *general intention to migrate* has also revealed interesting results. The possible migratory movement from Turkey is expected to include people from rural areas, with a lower level of income, and moreover, mobility among the unemployed is expected to be relatively high. Based on these three attributes, it can be argued that the possible migration from Turkey will result in serious adjustment problems in the labor force markets of the migrant receiving countries. However, another important aspect regarding the prospective emigrants within possible migratory movements from Turkey is that they are mainly university graduates or current students. Considering this aspect, possible migratory movements from Turkey may not cause serious integration problems in economic terms (İçduygu 2006).

The main conclusion here is that both the view of discrepancy based on demographic difference, and the view of complementariness based on demographic difference are inadequate in explaining how the potential international migratory movements will shape the EU-Turkey relations in the future. These differences may imply a potential for migratory movements, however, a series of quite different processes are required for this potential to be realized. What is important here is to explain how this process of transformation might occur

in the future. Also, it will not be very realistic to emphasize the positive impacts of the migratory movement from Turkey on the EU population solely based on the demographic complementariness thesis, and to expect that these positive impacts will immediately occur as soon as Turkey becomes a member state. Population and migration are dynamic elements, and these dynamic elements become even more complex through economic, social, and political processes.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Based on extensive literature review, this essay has addressed some of the economic and social consequences of emigration from and immigration to Turkey, and has related them to the human development in the country. Despite the plethora of studies on Turkey and international migration, few take a specific focus on the effects of these migratory movements on the country in general and on human development in specific. With the number of Turkish emigrants living abroad reaching more than four million people and with a level of annual immigration into the country amounting to a couple of hundred thousands, there is a need to extract and synthesize a coherent body of knowledge on the consequences of emigration and immigration for the people in Turkey.

The Turkish case provides a unique research setting mainly due to three basic reasons: *first*, Turkey keeps its significant position in the ongoing regimes of international migration within its neighboring regions of Europe, Asia, and Africa as a country of both some “old” and some “new” emigrations. *Secondly*, the country has also increasingly become a country of immigration and transit in the last three decades. *Thirdly*, although migration-related issues lost their official importance in the 1980s and 1990s, in recent years the Turkish governments again became very conscious about migration, mostly because of EU affairs.

Within this framework, the literature on Turkey and international migration provides conclusions on the economic and social consequences of emigration and immigration at a very high level of generality. This literature can be divided into three periods: (a) the 1960s and 1970s that witnessed a lively discussion on the likelihood of contribution of the emigration flows to the economy of the country both at macro and micro levels; (b) the periods of 1980s and 1990s that covered a sluggish debate, mostly on the negative social and cultural consequences of emigration, such as adaptation problems of children of return migrants or

revival of ethnic Kurdish nationalism and religious fundamentalism among Turkish emigrants in Europe; (c) the period of late 1990s and early 2000s when a dynamic debate started to emerge on the consequences of emigration and immigration, which is still far from being a thorough evaluation of the issue. In the meantime, emergence of immigration and transit flows into the country in the last three decades has made the migratory arena extremely complex in which any examination of the impact of international migration on development of the country and on its people becomes a difficult task.

On the whole, migration has been one of most powerful vehicles of social change in Turkey, but a lack of foresight and adequate planning has caused a partial waste of human and financial resources (Abadan-Unat 1986: 365). Still, migration has had highly positive contributions to Turkey's economic and social settings. To illustrate, it was a result of emigration that Turkey's unemployment problem was partly solved with three million expatriate Turkish citizens working in Europe; their remittances had financed two thirds of the country's trade deficit in the 1990s; and they took on the bridging role between Turkey and the EU (see Kaya & Kentel 2005). Likewise, it was a direct consequence of immigration that the human geography of internationally famed cities of Turkey, such as Antalya and Istanbul has enriched so much (İçduygu & Biehl 2008); or the labor demands of the domestic sector was largely met; or the revenues of "suitcase trade" ameliorated the economy at hard times. All in all, international migration has changed a lot in Turkish society, culture, and economy.

From the perspective of the experience of Turkish emigration since the early 1960s and that of the immigration since the early 1980s, possibly there are *three* main conclusions that one can draw in order to improve the positive human development outcomes of international migration and to reduce its negative effects: *Firstly*, there is a need for a good governance of international migration in which the crucial mechanism is the collaboration of the sending and receiving countries, and the migrants themselves throughout the whole process of migration, including pre-departure, migration itself, and post-arrival, and migrants' settlement and integration phases. *Secondly*, again there is a need for a good governance of international migration in which the two main state actors, the sending and receiving states, must share the burdens of the whole process rather than shifting them to the shoulders of other actor. *Thirdly*, in the age of globalization, the notion of transnationalism rather than that of nationalism must be incorporated into the idea of good governance of international migration by the related actors of the migratory process, the sending and receiving countries, and the migrants

themselves. Inevitably, international community with its international organizations and agencies must be playing its governance role in the good governance of international migration.

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Table 1: Turkish Labor Migration by Destination, 1961-2005

Host Countries	1961-1974		1975-1980		1981-1990		1991-1995		1996-2000		2001-2005		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Europe	790017	97.5	13426	12.8	2612	0.6	9647	2.8	10465	9.3	16561	9.1	842728	42.4
Arab Countries	2441	0.3	74181	70.6	423208	97.7	208274	60.4	32195	28.5	57974	31.9	798273	40.2
Australia	5806	0.7	2647	2.5	2478	0.6	1324	0.4	515	0.5	176	0.1	12946	0.7
CIS Countries		-		-		-	115	0.0	65521	58.0	89623	49.3	155259	7.8
Others	12235	1.5	14792	14.1	4875	1.1	125238	36.3	4256	3.8	17533	9.6	178929	9.0
Total	810499	100	105046	100	433173	100	344598	100	112952	100	181867	100	1988135	100

Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006a) based on various official sources in Turkey.

Table 2: Turkish Asylum-Seekers by Destination, 1981-2005

Destination	1981-1985		1986-1990		1991-1995		1996-2000		2001-2005		1981-2005	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Europe	45620		185797		175557	98.6	141226	97.9	107534	97.2	655734	98.7
Canada					755	0.4	1919	1.3	2451	2.2	5125	0.8
Australia					780	0.4	928	0.6	332	0.3	2040	0.3
USA					984	0.6	199	0.1	330	0.3	1513	0.2
Total					178076	100.0	144272	100.0	110647	100.0	664412	100.0

Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006a) from various sources of OECD and Eurostat..

Table 3: Figures Related to International Migratory Movements around Turkey (1996-2005) (persons)

Unregistered Migration	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
	18800	28400	29400	47500	94600	92400	82800	56200	61200	43841
*Illegal Entries					51400	57300	44200	30348	34745	19920
*Visa Expirations					43200	35100	38600	25852	26455	23921
Asylum Applications		5100	6800	6600	5700	5200	3794	3966	3908	3914
*Persons of Afghan origin					100	400	47	77	341	365
*Persons of Iranian origin		1700	2000	3800	3900	3500	2505	3108	2029	1716
*Persons of Iraqi origin		3300	4700	2500	1600	1000	974	342	964	1047
Residence Permits					168100	161254	157670	152203	155500	131594
*Work					24200	22414	22556	21650	27500	22130
*Education					24600	23946	21548	21810	15000	25240
*Other					119300	114894	113566	108743	113000	84244

Source: UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) Ankara Office (2002-2006); Aliens, Borders and Asylum Bureau (2000-2006).

Table 4: Asylum Applications to Turkey (1997-2005)

	Iranians		Iraqis		Others		Total	
	Case	Persons	Case	Persons	Case	Persons	Case	Persons
1997	746	1392	1275	2939	83	117	2104	4448
1998	1169	1979	2350	4672	124	187	3643	6838
1999	2069	3843	1148	2472	184	290	3401	6605
2000	2125	3926	791	1671	108	180	3024	5777
2001	1841	3485	497	998	372	709	2710	5177
2002	1456	2505	402	974	219	315	2077	3794
2003	1715	3092	159	342	373	514	2247	3948
2004	1225	2030	472	956	540	922	2237	3908
2005	1021	1716	490	1047	753	1151	2264	3914
Total	13367	23968	7584	16071	2756	4375	23707	44399

Source: Compiled by the author based on the data provided by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) Ankara Office (2002-2005) and Aliens, Borders and Asylum Bureau (2000-2005).

Table 5: Remittance Inflows, Exports, and Imports in Turkish Economy, 1964-2004

Year	Remittance (x Million USD)	Exports (x Million USD)	Imports (x Million USD)	Remittance as % of Trade Deficit	Remittance as % of GNP
1964	8	411	537	6.3	0.1
1965	69.8	464	572	64.6	0.6
1966	115.3	490	718	50.6	0.8
1967	93	523	685	57.4	0.6
1968	107.3	496	764	40.0	0.6
1969	140.6	537	801	53.3	0.7
1970	273	588	948	75.8	1.5
1971	471.4	677	1171	95.4	2.7
1972	740	885	1563	109.1	3.3
1973	1183	1317	2086	153.8	4.1
1974	1425	1532	3777	63.5	3.6
1975	1313	1401	4738	39.3	2.7
1976	982	1960	5129	31.0	1.8
1977	930	1753	5797	23.0	1.5
1978	983	2288	4599	42.5	1.4
1979	1694	2261	5069	60.3	2.2
1980	2071	2910	7909	41.4	3.0
1981	2490	4703	8933	58.9	3.4
1982	2140	5746	8843	69.1	3.2
1983	1513	5728	9235	43.1	2.4
1984	1807	7134	10757	49.9	3.0
1985	1714	8255	11344	55.5	2.5
1986	1634	7457	11105	44.8	2.1
1987	1021	10190	14158	25.7	1.2
1988	1776	11662	14335	66.4	2.0
1989	3040	12960	15792	107.3	2.8
1990	3243	13626	22302	37.4	2.2
1991	2819	13672	21038	38.3	1.9
1992	3008	14891	22872	37.7	1.9
1993	2919	15610	29428	21.1	1.6
1994	2627	18390	23270	53.8	2.0
1995	3327	21975	35709	24.2	2.0
1996	3542	32446	43627	31.7	1.9
1997	4197	32647	48599	26.3	2.2
1998	5356	31220	45922	36.4	2.6
1999	4529	29325	40671	39.9	2.5
2000	4560	31375	54503	19.7	2.3
2001	2786	35000	41399	43.5	1.9
2002	1936	35753	51554	12.3	1.1
2003	1710	47068	69340	7.7	0.7
2004	804	63121	97540	2.3	0.2
2005	851	73476	116773	1.9	0.2
2006	1111	85534	139575	2.1	0.3
2007	1209	107215	170373	2.0	0.2

Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006), based on various official sources in Turkey.

Table 6: Export, Workers' Remittances and Luggage Trade Revenues (million USD), 1996–2007

Years	Export	Luggage trade	Workers' remittances
1996	32067	8842	3542
1997	32110	5849	4197
1998	31662	3689	5356
1999	28842	2255	4529
2000	30721	2946	4560
2001	34347	3039	2786
2002	40071	4065	1936
2003	51130	3953	1710
2004	66956	3880	804
2005	76817	3473	851
2006	85535	6408	1111
2007	107215	6002	1209

Source: Treasury (2004), Central Bank of Turkey (2007).

Table 7: Turks Changing Citizenship in Europe by Country, 1991-2002

Country	1991-1993		1994-1996		1997-1999		2000-2002		1991-2002	
	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%
Germany	20.3	27.8	97.0	42.7	129.1	56.8	159.4	63.4	405.8	52.1
Austria	4.7	6.4	6.6	2.9	7.8	3.4	18.3	7.2	37.4	4.8
Belgium	7.2	9.9	13.0	5.7	17.5	7.7	31.7	12.6	69.4	8.9
Denmark	1.1	1.5	2.6	1.1	5.4	2.4	5.9	2.3	15.0	1.9
France	2.8	3.8	8.8	3.9	14.5	6.4	13.8	5.5	39.9	5.1
Netherlands	29.5	40.4	87.6	38.5	39.9	17.6	10.2	4.1	167.2	21.5
Sweden	5.8	7.9	7.6	3.3	4.9	2.2	4.2	1.7	22.5	2.9
Switzerland	1.4	1.9	3.6	1.6	6.2	2.7	6.2	2.5	17.4	2.2
UK	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.2	2.0	0.9	2.5	1.0	5.2	0.7
Total	73.0	100.0	227.3	100.0	227.3	100.0	251.2	100.0	778.8	100.0

Source: Compiled by İçduygu (2006) from various sources of OECD and Eurostat.

Table 8: Foreigners Who Have Acquired Turkish Citizenship, 1995–2006

Country	Number	Reason
Bulgaria	19998	Other
Bulgaria	3636	Marriage
Iraq	1384	Other
Iraq	251	Marriage
Iran	1080	Other
Iran	257	Marriage
Azerbaijan	3876	Marriage
Romania	2894	Marriage
Russia	2193	Marriage
Moldova	1292	Marriage
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>36861</i>	<i>65.30%</i>
Total Marriage	24300	43.00%
Total Others	32149	57.00%
Total	56449	100.00%

Source: Bureau of Population and Citizenship, Ministry of Interior (2001).